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ABSTRACT 
Since the start of Operation Enduring Freedom nearly seven years ago, 
Afghanistan has made only very limited progress towards reconstruction.  While 
they have experienced limited political progress under the framework agreed to 
in Bonn Agreement, the development, reform, and progress in other sectors of 
the society have predominantly fallen short of expectations.  After several years 
of relative calm, the Taliban reemerged in 2004 significantly increasing their 
operations and territorial control each year.  The influence of the Taliban was 
accelerated, in part, by the dissatisfaction of the population due to the lack of 
progress in post-conflict development.  In response, the international community 
and the United States are increasing the money and manpower dedicated to the 
reconstruction effort.  This thesis quantitatively analyzes the number, type, and 
location of reconstruction projects, the localized Taliban risk level, and the 
number, type, and location of Taliban attacks from January 2004 to June 2007.  
The goal of the analysis is to assess the effectiveness of the reconstruction effort 
at decreasing Taliban attacks and to uncover which sectors have the greatest 
impact and act as the key leverage points.  Through statistical calculations, it was 
determined that reconstruction projects targeting rural development, agricultural 
development, and natural resources development had the greatest effect on 
decreasing the Taliban presence.  Local, small-scale security projects, rather 
than decreasing attacks, actually increased Taliban attacks, in some cases 
accounting for an amazing 76 percent of the increase.  Additionally, the $10.3 
billion in strategic-level security and infrastructure improvements had no 
measurable impact on decreasing the level of Taliban attacks.  These trends, 
that direct aid to the livelihood of the population decreased attacks, and aid 
aimed at direct military confrontation with the Taliban actually increased attacks, 
reflects a classic counter-insurgency pattern.  This supports the position that the 
struggle against the Taliban in Afghanistan will not be won kinetically and a more 
counter-insurgency focused approach is required. 
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A. PREFACE - WHY AFGHANISTAN MATTERS 
America is currently at war, a war against terrorism, world-wide.  The key 
elements to winning this war are two-fold; not only fighting and winning battles, 
but also “promoting freedom as the alternative to tyranny and despair.” 1   By 
expanding and encouraging the forces of freedom, democracy, and human dignity, 
more nations will naturally tend toward peace, making the world a safer place for 
America.  As such, the first of two pillars that form our national security strategy 
includes promoting democracies, free and fair trade, development, accountable 
and effective governments, and economic policies that benefit individual citizens.2  
The recovery of Afghanistan from 25 years of civil war involves all of these 
elements.  The Taliban have been replaced by a constitution, free elections, and 
civil liberties, however, much work remains to be done.  According to President 
Bush, not only do they deserve the support from the US and international 
community, but the success in Afghanistan is a vital to national security interest to 
ensure terrorists cannot use it as a base of operations and launching pad for 
terror.3 
America’s stated goal in Afghanistan is to help the people of Afghanistan 
defeat the terrorists, and establish a stable, moderate, and democratic state that 
respects the rights of its citizens, governs its territory effectively, and is a reliable 
ally in the War on Terror.4   Key elements in accomplishing this goal include 
increasing the size and capabilities of the Afghan security forces, improving 
governance, developing the rural economy, by building irrigation, roads, power 
                                                 
1  George W. Bush, “Introductory Letter” The National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America, (Washington, D.C.: White House, March 2006). 
2  Bush. 
3 The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, (Washington, D.C.: White 
House, March 2006), 12. 
4 Fact Sheet: Goals for Afghanistan, (Washington, DC: White House – Office of the Press 
Secretary, 15 February, 2007) and Total US Security and Reconstruction Assistance to 
Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Department of State-Office of the Spokesman, 31 January 2006). 
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production, and micro-credit.5  How well we deliver on these promises will have a 
significant impact, not only on the life of Afghans, but also on our national security. 
B. PURPOSE 
We are approaching seven years since the beginning of Operation 
Enduring Freedom and the military effort to eliminate the Taliban and Al-Qaeda.  
At the five year mark in Operation Enduring Freedom there was a slew of analysis 
documenting the popular landmark, most noted the limited progress in the political, 
security, and reconstruction efforts, advances by the Taliban over the summer of 
2006 and the pending “spring offensive”.  While the territorial gains of the Taliban 
in 2007 may have been less than feared, they have certainly consolidated their 
hold in the south and east.6  As a result, portions of the country have transitioned 
from fragile or weak government with sporadic insurgent activity to a nearly failed 
state with a full-fledged insurgency.  In response, the international community in 
general, and the US in particular, plan to greatly expand their commitment to 
Afghanistan, by requesting an increase in aid money to $11.8 billion for the next 
two years and deploying additional military forces to the country.7   
When a similar “surge” was proposed for the war in Iraq it was 
accompanied by a comprehensive strategic review which resulted in a new 
counterinsurgency strategy.  While this new strategy received less media 
coverage, it was, in fact, a significant shift in how the war was being fought.  As a 
result, the surge of men and materials were not simply put in the field doing more 
of the same, but rather part of an entirely revamped approach. 
Is the same analysis required in Afghanistan?  Are more soldiers and more 
money the answer, or does the strategy itself need to be adjusted?  Has the 
                                                 
5 Fact Sheet: Goals for Afghanistan, (Washington, DC: White House – Office of the Press 
Secretary, 15 February 2007). 
6 A recent report by the Senlis Council states the Taliban have a permanent presence in 58 
percent of Afghanistan, predominantly in the south and east.  See: Stumbling into Chaos – 
Afghanistan on the Brink, (London: Senlis Council, November 2007), 6. 
7 Fact Sheet: Increasing Support to Help the People of Afghanistan Succeed  (Washington, 
DC: White House – Office of the Press Secretary, 15 February 2007). 
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current effort had any impact whatsoever, and if so, how can that be best 
capitalized?  What can we learn from the success and failures of the first six years 
as we move forward?  This thesis is a comprehensive examination of the entire 
reconstruction effort in terms of numbers, cost, types, and locations of projects 
while at the same time assessing the risk posed by the Taliban both in the general 
sense and in terms of the number, types and locations of attacks.  The 
quantitative analysis presented of the interaction between these two factors will 
highlight which types of reconstruction projects are most effective in reducing the 
Taliban threat. 
C. IMPORTANCE  
One of the critical lessons from the terrorist attacks on September 11th is 
that failed states matter.  We can no longer ignore or remain disinterested in failed 
states with little geo-political significance.  The question is on longer whether or 
not to become involved, but rather the degree and characterization of our 
involvement.  As such, defining the challenges and developing successful 
strategies for our involvement is vitally important.  Much has been written in both 
the theoretical sense and use of case studies on the consistent challenges and 
possible strategies to employ, and specific strategies are being utilized in 
Afghanistan today.  This paper will identify what aspects of the current 
reconstruction project strategy are working, which aspects are not, and what can 
be modified for future use. 
Almost all indicators of the tactical military situation with relation to the 
Taliban in Afghanistan have gotten progressively worse since 2004; from 2005 to 
2006 attacks on coalition forces increased by 250% and attacks on Afghan forces 
increased by nearly 400%, with the trend continuing into 2007.8  At the same time 
there is growing acceptance among some policy makers and regional experts that 
the fight against the Taliban is not going to be won through kill ratios and body 
                                                 
8 Anthony Cordesman, Winning in Afghanistan: How to Face the Rising Threat. (Washington, 
D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2006). 
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counts.  In fact, in many respects, killing a Taliban foot soldier can be 
counterproductive “When you kill a person it's a multiplication factor. It demands 
that all the male relatives join the fight."9  Additionally, collateral damage is having 
a devastating effect on the US effort.  “Killing one innocent Afghan civilian can 
turn a village against the Afghan government and coalition.”10  The situation in 
Afghanistan is no longer a protracted “mop-up” operation against lingering Taliban 
and al-Qaeda elements where killing the few remaining “bad-guys” is a plausible 
strategy, it has developed into a full blown insurgency against the Karzai 
government and as such requires a completely different strategic approach.  As 
with most insurgencies, this one can best by countered by gaining the “trust and 
confidence” of the Afghan people.11  This is achieved primarily by fulfilling your 
promises and meeting their expectations, notably, establish law and order and 
create the environment for economic growth and reconstruction.   
Unfortunately, our ability to fulfill promises and meet expectations was 
severely hampered for the first several years after the fall of the Taliban.  For a 
variety of political and policy reasons the administrations initial reaction to 
Afghanistan was to avoid the large-scale nation-building model used by President 
Clinton in Bosnia and Kosovo, instead opting for a smaller, lighter “footprint”.  As a 
result, “Afghanistan was the least resources of any major American led nation 
building operations since the end of WWII.”12  The administration is dramatically 
increasing its efforts at stabilizing and reconstructing Afghanistan.  After spending 
 
  
                                                 
9 Thomas H. Johnson quoted in: Ron Moreau, Sami Yousafzai, Zahid Hussain, and Rod 
Nordland.  “Into Thin Air” Newsweek, 150, No 10 (3 September 2007): 24. 
10 Seth G. Jones. Afghanistan’s Local Insurgency (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2007). 
11 Others may equate this to “winning the hearts and minds” of the Vietnam era, but they are 
actually quite different.  “Hearts and minds” implies a population that likes us and thinks like we 
do.  “Trust and confidence” means that the population does not have to like us, or become 
westernized, but they need to have faith in us as honest brokers, a stabilizing force in a corrupt 
environment, and can depend on us to follow through to completion on promises and 
commitments.  
12 James Dobbins. Ending Afghanistan’s Civil War (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2007) CT-271. 
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only $0.5 billion in the first year and $10.3 billion in the first six years, the 
President is planning to increase spending more than three-fold to $11.8 billion in 
the next two years.13   
An increase in funding is only half the picture, just as important is how that 
money will be spent.  What will be built, where, when, and for whom?  Money is 
not the end-all, it is a tool that must be carefully applied to maximize its 
effectiveness, and if used incorrectly it can have damaging effects.  Analyzing the 
current strategy, though under funded, will shed light on its effectiveness and help 
determining the utility of the current course of action.  Are reconstruction priorities 
properly set and just require additional resources, is another approach required?  
Is a single national strategy still relevant, or should two separate policies be 
adopted, one for the South and East regions where Afghanistan is closer to “failed 
state” and requires a counter-insurgency approach and a second for the North 
and West regions which are holding steady at “weak state” status, and where 
post-conflict reconstruction theories and approaches are still applicable?  
Certainly these are important questions to ask as we increase our commitment.   
After several years of stalled progress in meeting the expectations of 
Afghans, the country is at a critical juncture in reducing the growing influence of 
the Taliban.  In an era of limited budgets and limited resources the United States 
can ill afford wasted efforts.14  We need to get it right, emphasizing the areas that 
are cost effective and provide the most leverage against the Taliban.  Before 
simply increasing the volume of resources dedicated to our current approach it 
                                                 
13 Fact Sheet: Increasing Support to Help the People of Afghanistan Succeed (Washington, 
DC: White House – Office of the Press Secretary, 15 February 2007) and Total US Security and 
Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan (Washington, DC: Department of State-Office of the 
Spokesman, 31 January 2006). 
14 US efforts are also diluted by the fact that 86 percent of US aid comes in the form of 
“phantom aid” according to Real Aid - An Agenda for Making Aid Work (June 2005 page 30) and 
Real Aid 2 – Making Technical Assistance Work (2006) both reports written by ActionAid 
International.  They define phantom aid as aid that never materializes in the target country 
because it is diverted for other purposes.  Some examples include aid that must be spent on 
overpriced US goods and services and technical assistance, aid counted as debt relief, and aid 
used to cover excessively high transaction costs, immigrations charges and administrative fees. 
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needs to be more closely analyzed.  We may find out that not only do we need 
more money, but a completely different strategy. 
D. PRIMARY THESIS ARGUMENT 
Quantitative and statistical analysis often results in completely new insights 
and disproves previous assumptions.  By comparing the overall level of the 
stabilization and reconstruction effort and the emphasis levels on specific sectors 
of that effort, with the level of risk posed by the Taliban and the level of Taliban 
attacks, the data reveals some counterintuitive results.  The $10 billion effort to 
rebuild major elements of the national infrastructure and improve security at the 
strategic level is having no measurable effect on the number of Taliban attacks.  
On the contrary, an increase in security projects actually leads to an increase in 
Taliban attacks.  Clearly, the current reconstruction effort is not having the 
intended effects and a new approach is required. 
E. METHODOLOGY AND SOURCES  
1. General Approach  
This study will attempt to measure the effectiveness of the current stability 
and reconstruction strategy in reducing violence through a series of extensive 
quantitative analysis of the aid programs themselves, and comparing that to 
increased (or decreased) levels of security as assessed by the United Nations 
and the number of Taliban attacks.  Analysis will be conducted at both the 
province and district levels, using a variety of timeframes and analytical 
perspectives.  This approach facilitates the inclusion of multiple sources of data, 
thereby increasing the overall confidence level of the results, and eliminates some 
of the difficulties in focusing either too narrowly or too broadly.   
Studying an element of current history always poses unique challenges as 
the situation on the ground can change dramatically in a very short period.  This is 
especially true when undertaking a quantitative analysis such as the one 
presented here.  A dramatic bombing, or assassination, or tide-changing event 
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can be easily accounted for and included in a more subjective study.  Statistics, 
databases, and budgets, while more objective, present the inherent problem of 
lagging behind reality.  By definition, a monthly summary of attack data, or a 
USAID monthly field report includes data that can be thirty days old.  Add to that 
the time required for bureaucracies to, in varying degrees, process, verify, 
consolidate, incorporate, screen, and publish, and there is often a time lag of 
several months before data are available to the public.   
Since the situation is constantly evolving as events on the continue to 
unfold and even the most current statistical data available is often two to six 
months old, the requirement to clearly state the time period of analysis becomes 
essential.  For this study data on the reconstruction effort and the level of Taliban 
violence will only be considered between 1 January 2004 and 30 June 2007.  
These dates are not arbitrary.  There is a general consensus that the Taliban 
resurgence began in earnest in 2004, which provides a logical start date.  The 
end date was determine primarily by the availability of reconstruction and attack 
data.15  Naturally, this means all events in the latter half of 2007 and the winter of 
2008 are not included.  Any impact from cabinet secretaries visiting Afghanistan, 
NATO defense ministers debating Afghanistan, a new wave of spectacular suicide 
bombings, and recent ISAF offensives, which may eventually result in shifts in the 
data trends are not represented in this study. 
2. Sources  
The data used to measure and asses the international stabilization and 
reconstruction effort is the Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP), version 
VII, with and effective date of 30 June, 2007.  Other databases are available and 
                                                 
15 When this study was undertaken in earnest in its current from in September 2007, the latest 
edition of the reconstruction database used in the study included events up to 30 June 2007.  The 
next edition was not scheduled for widespread release until January 2008 (according to email 
correspondence with ACSP project officer in Afghanistan).  Likewise, the attack database was 
only updated on a quarterly basis.  When the majority of the attack data was gathered in 
November 2007, the most current event in the database was 30 June 2007 (results of queries on 
21 November 2007).  As late as February 2008, the database only contained attack information up 
to 30 September 2007 (results of queries on 19 February 2007).  It was therefore, out of necessity 
that 30 June 2007 was selected for the end date of analysis. 
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more widely known but each represented limitations that would affect either the 
quality of the data, or the utility of the formatting.  For example the United Nations 
maintains separate Donor Assistance Databases for numerous countries, 
including Afghanistan.16  Another database consider for the study was the product 
published by the Afghanistan Ministry of Finance. 17   The ACSP was initially 
developed by the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) but is used 
extensively throughout the government of Afghanistan and international donor 
community to track, monitor and de-conflict all reconstruction and stabilization 
efforts countrywide.  It consists of over 47,000 individual projects with projected 
costs of over $14 billion, ranging from small-scale reconstruction projects and 
Provincial Reconstruction Team efforts to larger strategic efforts such as 
rebuilding the “ring road”.  Additionally, the reconstruction efforts are categorized 
according to the eight pillars of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy 
(ANDS).18 
The Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) is the primary database 
used to track attack data because it possessed the best and most comprehensive, 
unclassified Afghanistan dataset. 19    Additionally, it contains complete 
categorization of victims and targets, which allows accurate comparison to 
reconstruction and stabilization sectors.  However, in order to verify the 
information, additional sources were used.  In addition to the raw number of 
attacks, the United Nations risk assessment maps, developed by the United 
Nations Department of Safety and Security will also be utilized. 
                                                 
16 Access on-line via: http://aacadad.synisys.com/idmafg/idmMain/loader.asp (accessed 27 
June 2007). 
17 Access on-line via: http://203.215.43.35/html/dad/msaccessdad.html (accessed 16 March 
2008). 
18 Afghanistan National Development Strategy – Summary Report, (Government of 
Afghanistan), 20. http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/I-ANDS/ands-
documents.asp?page=883736&numbpar=css&lang=eng&cont=right&class=dari (accessed 16 
March 2008). 
19 Access on-line via:  http://wits.nctc.gov/Main.do (accessed 16 March 2008).  
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3. Methodology  
While the sites identified above provided the initial sources for the 
quantitative data, each database was subjected to extensive screening, 
modifications, and further categorization to meet the needs of this study.  As a 
result the multiple datasets analyzed in each chapter differ greatly from the 
original data, in some cases reflecting more detailed information, new distinct 
categories and fields of data, and screening procedures developed specifically for 
the study.   
Because the datasets that are used in the statistical calculations are 
significantly different that those retrievable from the sources listed, there is a 
heavy emphasis on the methodology employed in each chapter.  Detailing the 
specific modifications made to each dataset will ensure the results are repeatable 
and will increase the overall confidence level in the data and ultimately confidence 
in the results.  Where appropriate, based on time and space constraints, 
summarized versions of the datasets used in the chapters were included as 
appendixes. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS 
1. Chapter II - Post-Conflict Reconstruction – Theory and Reality 
Chapter II examines the area of post-conflict reconstruction, both from a 
theoretical perspective and the realities experienced in Afghanistan.  The major 
theoretical approaches are reviewed, addressing various perspectives on the 
definitions, goals, challenges and sequencing of restoring failed states.  This 
section highlights the lack of consensus within the academic community on the 
best methods, overall strategies and even disagreement on whether post-conflict 
reconstruction should be attempted.  Moving from theory to reality, the situation in 
Afghanistan is presented in stages.  First, relevant details surrounding the end to 
the war and the immediate challenges thereafter are discussed.  Second, the 
initial strategies employed and shortfalls in the political, military, and 
reconstruction arenas are discussed.  Third, an updated review of the current 
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situation and current threats is presented.  Lastly, a summary of the various 
theories presented and the effectiveness of the theories employed in Afghanistan. 
2. Chapter III - District Level Analysis  
Chapter III is the first of three chapters dedicated to statistical analysis.  In 
each chapter a different approach is employed and the methodology behind the 
approach is discussed.  Chapter III focuses on twenty two different districts, using 
the UN Risk Assessment maps as a measure of Taliban influence, and modified 
portions of the ACSP to measure the reconstruction effort.  The analysis showed 
a negative correlation between the overall number of projects and the level of risk, 
with infrastructure projects and agriculture and rural development projects having 
the greatest effect.  Security projects were shown to have no impact on the level 
of risk posed by the Taliban.  
3. Chapter IV - Provincial Level Analysis - Part I 
Chapter IV introduces changes in the level of analysis and the type of data 
studied.  The level of analysis is shifted from the district to fourteen provinces.  
The ASCP is still used to measure reconstruction, but includes strategic projects 
whose impact can only be measured at the province level, for the first time.  
Additionally, a dataset based on the information from WITS is used instead of the 
UN Risk Assessment maps.  Analysis between the total numbers for 
reconstruction and attacks were conducted, in addition to the relationship 
between specific sectors of the reconstruction effort and specific Taliban targets. 
The approach in this chapter reveals some significant findings, among 
them, the $3.7 billion investment in strategic projects had no effect on reducing 
the level of Taliban attacks, an increase in security projects actually resulted in an 
increase in Taliban attacks, and lastly, other than security projects, efforts in 
certain areas of reconstruction did not result in a corresponding rise in Taliban 
attacks against that sector.  In other words, building more schools did not result in 
more Taliban attacks against schools. 
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4. Chapter V - Provincial Level Analysis - Part II 
Chapter V presents the last set of analytical data.  Various approaches are 
described, each an attempt to test previous results while addressing some of the 
inherent limitations of the very detailed approaches utilized in the earlier chapters.  
Most notably is the inclusion of every province, making this the first nation-wide 
analysis.  Additionally, data was analyzed over an aggregated four year period, 
instead of the year-to-year approach in Chapters II and III, and the introduction of 
an attack “intensity” metric.  The results of these calculations primarily confirmed 
earlier conclusions, namely the positive correlation between security projects and 
Taliban attacks, and the lack of any influence from the strategic project efforts on 
reducing levels of violence. 
5. Chapter VI - Conclusions 
Chapter VI reviews the approaches and methodological procedures 
employed in each chapter.  The results of each section are compared and 
contrasted and possible causes are addressed.  Finally, the implications of the 
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II. POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION – THEORY AND 
REALITY  
A. REVIEW OF POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION THEORY  
There is little consensus in current operational and academic literature on 
post-conflict reconstruction.  In fact, there are wide variations on everything from 
definitions and terminology, goals, key challenges, and best practices.  One of the 
few points of consensus are that too little is written on the subject, many gaps in 
our collective knowledge remain, failed states are important, and establishing 
security first is essential.20 
1. Definitions 
With respect to definitions, it is safe to say there is a fluid spectrum within 
the international system of strong, weak, fragile, failing, failed, and collapsed 
states.21  Each end of the spectrum is relatively easy to define.  Strong states are 
those that “unquestionably control their territory and deliver a full range and high 
quality of political goods to its citizens.”22  At the other end is the rare and extreme 
version of a state where the central authority fails to exist.  It is no longer a state, 
but rather a geographical area with a complete vacuum of authority.23  Warlords, 
strongmen, or other non-state actors exert control over specific regions of the 
territory, continually fighting each other.  Currently experts cite Somalia as the 
sole remaining such state, with Afghanistan, Lebanon, Bosnia, Nigeria and Sierra 
Leone among those that have recently recovered from such a state.24  However, 
                                                 
20 Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren, “The Challenges of Postconflict Development,” in 
Postconflict Development – Meeting New Challenges, Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren. eds. 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 2-5 and Robert I. Rotberg, “The Failure and 
Collapse of Nation-States: Breakdown, Prevention, and Repair,” in When States Fail: Causes and 
Consequences, Robert I. Rotberg. ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004), 2. 
21 Rotberg, 1. 
22 Ibid., 4. 
23 Ibid., 9. 
24 Ibid., 10. 
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there is a difference of opinion on what this extreme end of the spectrum is called.  
As Brinkerhoff points out, some refer to such an extreme case as Somalia as a 
“failed state”.  In his opinion, “failed” is an overused term to address states that 
are beyond “failed” and fall into the “collapsed” category and others that are “more 
appropriated called fragile, and are very similar to many poor counties suffering 
from institutional weakness and capacity gaps.”25   
Between strong and collapsed states there are weak, fragile, failing, and 
failed states.  While there are variations between scholars, generally, in weak 
states internal discord is not openly violent, but the capability of the government to 
provide for the common good of its citizens is “diminished or declining.”26  In 
fragile, failing and failed states, several forces are at work: a general breakdown 
of law and order, open conflict between state and insurgent or criminal forces, and 
inability to protect the citizens or provide for their basic needs and public goods, 
inability to extend state control throughout the entire territory.  Additionally, 
citizens start to turn to non-state actors to provide security and basic necessities.  
The subjective interpretation these elements and their intensity, duration, and 
pervasiveness can place a state in one category or another.27   
Another alternative conceptualization of the spectrum is presented by the 
Fund for Peace in their annual Failed State Index.  Using numerical values for 
twelve social, economic and political criteria, they rank 177 countries into four 
categories: Sustainable, Moderate, Warning, and Alert.28  While this approach 
provides a quantitative ranking structure the downside is that the use of only four 
categories is too broad.  While other experts reserved the “collapsed” label for 
                                                 
25 Derick W. Brinkerhoff, “Introduction – governance challenges in fragile states: re-
establishing security, rebuilding effectiveness, and reconstituting legitimacy,” in Governance in 
Post-Conflict Societies – rebuilding fragile states, Derick W. Brinkerhoff. ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 3. 
26 Rotberg, 4. 
27 Brinkerhoff, 2 and Rotberg, 5-9. 
28 Fund for Peace – Failed State Index Rankings 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366 
(accessed 13 March 2008). 
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only one state, Somalia, the Failed State Index has 32 states in the Alert category, 
grouping Somalia with established democracies such as Pakistan and Kenya 
(prior to the recent post-election violence).  Likewise the United States and the 
United Kingdom and not currently considered Sustainable, but rather, rank in the 
Moderate category, a category they share with countries such as Mongolia, Latvia, 




Figure 1.   Spectrum of State Strength 
 
Figure 1 provides a rough correlation between the categories used in 
quantitative methodology of the Failed State Index and the more subjective terms 
and methodologies of the reviewed literature.  While some experts think the 
differentiation between fragile and collapsed are critical, the Failed State Index 
lumps them into the same category.  At the other end of the spectrum, however, 
the more subjective analysts would group more countries into the Strong category, 
arguing that both the United States and the United Kingdom exercise control of 
their territory and deliver goods and services to the population, while the Failed 
State Index takes a more critical look, subdividing Strong into Sustainable and 
Moderate.   
Just as “failed state” can be interpreted different ways, so to can “post-
conflict.”  In the context of post-conflict reconstruction, the societies are usually 
not violence free, nor are they very far removed from conflict.  Scholars may differ 
on the specifics, but generally, post-conflict does not mean an absence of 
violence throughout the country, but more likely a situation “where conflict has 
                                                 
29 Fund for Peace – Failed State Index Rankings. 
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subsided to a greater or lesser degree, but is ongoing or recurring in some parts 
of the country.”30  Or put another way, where “open warfare has come to and 
end.”31  Likewise, even if the open warfare has subsided, societies rarely put the 
conflict behind them.  In fact, according to the World Bank, 44 percent of post-
conflict situations revert back to open warfare in the first five years.32  This creates 
and reinforces a desperate cycle where “pervasive poverty makes societies more 
vulnerable to violent conflict, while conflict itself creates more poverty.”33  In a 
sense, post-conflict reconstruction, at its core, is an attempt to break this cycle. 
2. Post-Conflict Reconstruction – A Negative Trend? 
Not only are the goals of post-conflict reconstruction debated, but there are 
various arguments given against the entire idea of post-conflict reconstruction.  
There is a school of thought that says the Westphalian system of nation-states is 
not a universal fit.  While acknowledging that some failed or collapsed states can 
be returned to functioning status, the international community must accept that 
some cannot.  These scholars suggest we must consider a return to an older 
system where states “co-existed with areas of less government structure than 
meets the statehood criteria.” 34   Other scholars offer a slightly different 
perspective, emphasizing the differences between de facto states and de jure 
states.  De jure states they argue “exist by fiat of the international community 
which recognizes them as sovereign entities whether or not they have a 
                                                 
30 Brinkerhoff, 3. 
31 Junne and Verkoren, 1. 
32 The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
2004), 8; and P. Collier, L Elliott, H. Hergre, A. Hoeffler, A. Reynol-Querol, and N. Sambanis. 
Breaking the Conflict Trap: Civil War and Development Policy, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003). Quoted in Derick W. Brinkerhoff. “Introduction – governance challenges in fragile 
states: re-establishing security, rebuilding effectiveness, and reconstituting legitimacy” in 
Governance in Post-Conflict Societies – rebuilding fragile states. Derick W. Brinkerhoff, ed. (New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 3. 
33 The Role of the World Bank in Conflict and Development. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 
2004), 14. 
34 Christopher Clapham, “The Global-Local Politics of State Decay,” in When States Fail: 
Causes and Consequences, Robert I. Rotberg, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 
2004), 78. 
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government which can effectively control or administer the territory.”35  While de 
facto states are the institutions and power bases that actually administer a 
territory.36  States that are recognized internationally and can control their territory 
are both de jure and de facto.37  However, there are numerous states that are 
only de jure states, that is, they are states in name only.  Afghanistan is an 
example of a de jure state with very weak central government institutions and 
limited military control over much of the country, especially in the south and south-
east.38  Typically, the goal of post-conflict reconstruction is to, in the broad sense, 
help the transition towards a de jure and de facto state.  This is often doomed to 
failure, they argue, because the major power brokers in the country operate in 
both worlds and have nothing to gain by seeing them consolidated; they owe their 
de jure position to their de facto power, and influence de jure policy to maintain de 
facto power.39 
Still others suggest changes to the international system that acknowledges 
that failed states are not an anomaly, but rather, a natural step in developing a 
fully functioning nation-state, noting it took 300 to 500 years to formalize France’s 
modern borders.40  They propose that we should decertify states that no longer 
maintain sovereign control over their territory and in a manner consistent with the 
philosophy that inclusion in the political process “normalizes” behavior; we should 
establish new procedures for recognizing new states that acknowledges gains 
made by sub-national groups.41  Another alternative approach states that the 
                                                 
35 Sarah Lister and Andrew Wilder,  “Subnational Administration and state building: lessons 
from Afghanistan” in Governance in Post-Conflict Societies – rebuilding fragile states, Derick W. 
Brinkerhoff, ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 243. 
36 Lister and Wilder, 243. 
37 Ibid.. 
38 Lister and Wilder, 243; It should be noted, however, that in the hinterlands the traditional 
tribal institutions are very prominent, effective and enduring. 
39 Lister and Wilder, 243. 
40 Malcolm Anderson. Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World. 
(Cambridge, 1996), 23. quoted in Jeffrey Herbst, “Let them Fail: State Failure in Theory and 
Practice” in When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, Robert I. Rotberg. ed. (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 303. 
41 Herbst, 312-315. 
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current efforts at post-conflict reconstruction are actually overly ambitious nation-
building projects, placing western institutions, values, and procedures on societies 
that lack the history, experience and civil society to support such systems; in the 
end, they may do more harm than good.  The end goal should not be a perfect 
westernize society, but rather a government that is just good enough.42 
3. Post-Conflict Reconstruction - Very Similar to Development 
Alternative solutions aside, there is a growing, although still limited, number 
of scholars addressing how to best restore collapsed and failed states into 
functioning governments. 43   Some scholars believe that post-conflict 
reconstruction has a lot of similarities, and lessons to be learned from, traditional 
development efforts in peace-time third world countries.  They argue the keys to 
success in both cases are the same: a long-term time requirement and 
                                                 
42 John J. Hamre and Gordon R. Sullivan, “Toward Postconflict Reconstruction” The 
Washington Quarterly 25, No 4, (Autumn 2002): 85-96; and Michael Barnett, “Building a 
Republican Peace,” International Security, 30, no. 4 (Spring 2006): 87-112. 
43 For theoretical holistic approaches see:  Francis Fukuyama. ed. Nation-building: Beyond 
Afghanistan and Iraq. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2006); Gerd Junne and 
Willemijn Verkoren. eds.  Postconflict Development – Meeting New Challenges. (Boulder, CO: 
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005); Ho-Won Jeong. Peacebuilding in Postconflict Societies – 
Strategy and Process. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005); Robert I Rotberg. ed.  
When States Fail: Causes and Consequences. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2004).  
For detailed sector specific studies see: Albrecht Schnabel and Hans-George Ehrhart. eds. 
Security Sector reform and Post-Conflict Peacebuilding. (New York: United Nations University 
Press, 2005); David M. Law. "Conclusion: Security Sector (Re) Construction in Post-conflict 
Settings." International Peacekeeping 13, No. 1 (March 2006); 111-123; Derick W. Brinkerhoff. ed.  
Governance in Post-Conflict Societies – rebuilding fragile states. (New York: Routledge, 2007); 
also John Hamre, Gordon Sullivan, Scott Feil, Robert Orr, and Johanna Mendelson Forman in a 
series covering economics, security and government in The Washington Quarterly 25, No 4, 
(Autumn 2002): 85-152.   
For a greater operational and policy focus see: Craig Cohen. Measuring Progress in 
Stabilization and Reconstruction. (Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace. March 
2006); Garland H. Williams.  Engineering Peace – the Military Role in Postconflict Reconstruction. 
(Washington, D.C.: United States Institute for Peace Press, 2005); James Dobbins, John McGinn, 
Keith Crane, Seth Jones, Rollie Lal, Andrew Rathmell, Rachel Swanger, and Anga Timilsina.  
America’s Role in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq. (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2003); James 
Dobbins, Seth Jones, Keith Crane, Andrew Rathmell, Brett Steele, Richard Teltschik, and Anga 
Timilsina.  UN’s Role in Nation-Building from the Congo to Iraq. (Arlington, VA: RAND, 2005.); 
Play to Win. (Washington, D.C. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and 
Association of the US Army (AUSA), January 2003); Robert I. Rotberg, ed. Building a New 
Afghanistan. (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution Press, 2007); Robert C. Orr. ed.  
Winning the Peace – an American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction. (Washington, D.C.: 
Center for Strategic and International Studies Press, 2004). 
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commitment, slow incremental change, importance of locals “in the driver’s seat”, 
need for donor restraint on projects beyond the need or capacity of the local 
conditions, and the importance of what international partners do, with whom, and 
how.44  Additionally, both endeavors face the same three dilemmas or constraints: 
1) Time – trying to accomplish too much too fast usually results in nothing getting 
done well (if at all), but too slow and methodical risks alienating the population; 2) 
External Influence – too much conditionality, or outside influence in governance 
can lead to a backlash from the population, but too little international influence 
and the country may not develop the civil society and institutions required to 
support the international community’s ideal versions of governance; 3) 
Government Transition – the international community cannot be sure that open 
elections in unstable society will not bring religious radical or political extremists 
into power. 45   Also, three instrumental lessons from development should be 
considered in post-conflict reconstruction.  First, patience – maintain a long time 
horizon and expect setbacks; second, be adaptable – maintain flexibility on 
sequencing and content of reforms keeping the focus on outcome not process; 
lastly, start small – concentrate on do-able projects that matter to the community, 
keep modest expectations and accept incremental progress in some areas, while 
accepting a flawed system in other areas.46  In summary, these experts argue that 
both development and post-conflict reconstruction share the same keys to 
success and constraints.  Additionally, the key lessons from successful 
development efforts also apply to post-conflict reconstruction. 
4. Post-Conflict Reconstruction - Very Different from 
Development 
The more dominant school of thought, is that post conflict reconstruction is 
not simply traditional development, but rather something completely new, drawing 
                                                 
44 Brinkerhoff, 13 -14. 
45 Arthur A. Goldsmith, “Does nation building work? Reviewing the Record,” in Governance in 
Post-Conflict Societies – rebuilding fragile states, Derick W. Brinkerhoff. ed. (New York: 
Routledge, 2007), 41. 
46 Goldsmith, 41. 
 20
elements from multiple aid sectors.  Civilian aid agencies can be organized into 
three categories depending on their focus: peace building (such as Search for 
Common Ground), Emergency assistance (Doctors Without Borders), and long-
term development (Oxfam).  While all three have their unique focus and 
advantages, separately none of them are well suited to post-conflict 
reconstruction.  Peace builders often lose interest after the fighting has stopped, 
emergency assistance groups are typically not interested in the origins of the 
conflict, or the resolution, just the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all, and 
developers often find the post-conflict arena too violent and chaotic.47   
Despite acknowledgement from the international community and aid 
organizations as far back as 1995 that there is a significant difference between 
peacetime development, or what was traditionally called development, and post-
conflict reconstruction, there is still a lack of consensus on strategy and no 
agreement on best practices.48  The need to resolve these shortcomings has 
been the subject of UN reports and scholars papers for nearly ten years.  One 
report in 2001 notes “it is now generally accepted that international organizations 
should be aware of conflict and, where possible, gear their work towards conflict 
resolution and helping rebuild war-torn societies in a way that will avert future 
violence.”49  Despite the identified need, very little progress has been made, or 
even ideas proposed on how to accomplish this transformation.50  As another 
expert noted, the development-security nexus is “under researched and has yet to 
establish its own conceptual language.”51 
While the procedures and programs for handling the development-security 
nexus are debated (or ignored), the revolutionary notion of using the development 
community to “fix” societies cannot be overlooked.  The idea that reconstruction 
                                                 
47 Junne and Verkoren, 5. 
48 Ibid., 2. 
49 Mark Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars - the Merging of Development and 
Security (London: Zed Publishing, 2001), 1. 
50 Junne and Verkoren, 4. 
51 Duffield, 9. 
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must be done in a manner to prevent war is a new concept in the development 
community, with some proposing direct action where “Societies must be changed 
so that past problems do not arise.” 52   This is a far cry from the counter 
arguments already presented to either let states fail or make governments that 
are just “good enough.”  This philosophy is championed by other experts who 
point out that post-conflict development must be conflict-conscious development, 
whose primary goal is sustaining the peace and that simply be rebuilding or 
reconstructing the old society structures will most likely just recreate the same 
grievances that led to conflict in the beginning.53  
Just as restoring the political institutions to pre-conflict setting can be 
counter-productive; the same can be said for the economic sector.  Further 
highlighting the differences between traditional development and post-conflict 
reconstruction, the traditional goal of “jumpstarting the economy” is a dangerous 
objective and the aid community must be carful not to simple restore the “politico 
economic problems that contributed to state failure in the first place, as well as 
any new ones…economic policy must be formulated and implemented in 
politically sensitive way.”54  In contrast to conventional economic thinking, when 
operating in a post-conflict reconstruction environment, rather than simply 
erecting, or employing, the most expedient methods and actors to deliver goods 
or collect revenue, the larger, long-term political ramifications of who is used and 
how they are used must be considered.55  Or put another way, political-economic 
considerations must take precedence over economic efficiencies.56  Additionally, 
post-conflict situations place additional strains which are not a factor in peacetime 
                                                 
52 Duffield, 15. 
53 Junne, 6. 
54 Donald R. Snodgrass, “Restoring Economic Functioning in Failed States,” in When States 
Fail: Causes and Consequences, Robert I. Rotberg, ed. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 2004), 260. 
55 Lister and Wilder, 242. 
56 Snodgrass, 260, 267. 
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development projects, namely the resources required to rehabilitate, resolve and 
prevent conflict and violence and strife within the community.57 
Under this approach, even the most benign projects can have significant 
impact.  Rebuilding a road becomes a major political and conflict sensitive 
endeavor when you consider who the road connects, and who it does not connect, 
where it starts and stops, which section of the road will be repaired first, and the 
fact that roads inherently give advantage to those with modern transportation and 
expand the reach of the central government.  As such, building a road, even 
repairing the previously existing road, may only serve to ignite tensions and a 
return to violence. 
5. Post-Conflict Reconstruction - No Clear Strategy 
Since there is little agreement on what post-conflict reconstruction is, or is 
not, or even whether the international community should be involved in such 
projects, it should not be surprising there is a lack of consensus on how to 
execute post-conflict reconstruction.  There are differences on which sectors of 
the society should be considered, their relative importance and the sequencing of 
the overall effort.  For example, Junne and Verkoren use infrastructure, education, 
health, economic, and aid as the key elements, but they caveat that these sectors 
must be considered in relation to the root causes of the initial conflict.  They 
breakdown the causes into four primary clusters: external / international, 
characteristics of the state (too weak or too strong), characteristics of the society 
(economic inequalities, ethnic cleavages), and individual orientations (religion, 
ideology, cultures).58  The degree to which these four clusters represent the root 
causes of the conflict will dramatically alter how post-conflict reconstruction 
should proceed.  An alternative approach is presented by Rotberg which focuses 
on economy, rule of law and civil society.59  Jeong, on the other hand, examines 
                                                 
57 Brinkerhoff, 3. 
58 Junne and Verkoren, 7. 
59 Rotberg (2004), 32. 
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the “social and psychological factors” of political transition, development, and 
reconciliation and social rehabilitation.60 
While there is no consensus on best practices, some scholars cite the work 
by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) and Association of 
the US Army (AUSA), as “perhaps the most well-elaborated framework…including 
attention to governance…on post-conflict reconstruction.” 61   This approach 
focuses on four “pillars” of post-conflict reconstruction: security, justice and 
reconciliation, economic and social well-being, and governance and participation, 
in addition to four critical “enablers”: strategy and planning, implementation 
infrastructure, training and education, and funding.62   
6. Security – an “Absolute Prerequisite” 
Perhaps the one, and seemingly only, area where the experts are almost 
unanimous is the prerequisite for security.  As Rotberg notes, and other agree, “a 
lasting cease fire must be achieved first, before any other improvements can be 
introduced” and “without fundamental law and order, resuscitation and nation 
building are chimera.” 63   At the most basic level, even within peacetime, 
developed nations, the primary function of a state is to provide security (from 
external and internal threats).  Only after security is reasonable assured can the 
state deliver second-tier public goods.64  Few, if any, states can provide public 
goods in the absence of security.  As such, Dirk Salomons considers security an 
“absolute prerequisite” to recovery process.65  Security is considered the one key 
precursor to stabilization, without it there will be little progress in the fields of 
                                                 
60 Jeong, 6. 
61 Brinkerhoff, 19. and Junne and Verkoren, 2. 
62 Play to Win, 6.  
63 Rotberg (2004), 32-33; Brinkerhoff, 5; Dirk Salomons, “Security: An Absolute Prerequisite,” 
in Postconflict Development – Meeting New Challenges, Gerd Junne and Willemijn Verkoren, eds. 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2005), 19; Nicole Ball, “Democratic governance and the 
security sector in conflict-affected countries,” in Governance in Post-Conflict Societies – rebuilding 
fragile states, Derick W. Brinkerhoff. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2007), 85. 
64 Rotberg (2004), 3. 
65 Salomons, 19. 
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politics and economic recovery.66  In this context security is not just the protection 
from wanton killing, but it encompasses the military, militia, police and other state 
security forces; not only must they provide protection to the society, but they must 
not victimize the society.  Issues such as corruption, discipline, accountability, 
reform and oversight are key elements to security.  As one of the most visible 
arms of the government, rouge and corrupt security elements delegitimize the 
government, impede basic services and lead to the return of violence.67 
As discussed, the need for security does not mean completely free of 
violence, but rather an end to open warfare.  It should be pointed out, however, 
that as disparate the theories and approaches on post-conflict reconstruction may 
be, they can only be utilized in areas where the majority of violence as subsided.   
In summary, there is a broad range of opinions among the experts in the 
field of post-conflict reconstruction.  The differences go far beyond two competing 
schools of thought, but rather range the entire spectrum from “let them fail” to 
make them “just good enough” to full-blown social engineering and “fixing” 
societies.  Experts that can agree post-conflict reconstruction is something worth 
doing cannot agree on the best methodology to accomplish the goals, or even the 
most appropriate paradigm for analyzing the problem.  Some argue this should be 
treated similarly to traditional development, while others contend this is an entirely 
different problem requiring a more integrated holistic approach.  While the later is 
gaining prominence, they can agree on the importance of security, but little else.  
Questions of which other sectors are most important, the proper sequencing of 
reforms, centralized or decentralized control, proper levels of external influence 
and countless others have yet to be definitively answered.   
Although there is no record of national policy makers reaching out to the 
epistemic community for assistance on the initial post-conflict reconstruction 
strategy for Afghanistan, if they had, they would not have received any consensus 
                                                 
66 Brinkerhoff, 5. 
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opinions on a roadmap.  As a result, faced with some daunting challenges, the 
initial post-conflict reconstruction program achieved very limited success. 
B. THE REALITY OF AFGHANISTAN  
1. Initial Challenges – The End of the War 
On 14 November 2001 the United Nations passed United Nations Security 
Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1378 calling for the United Nations to play a central 
role in the establishment of a transitional government in Afghanistan and calling 
for member states to assist with security, stability and reconstruction efforts.68  
The task ahead was daunting.  Nearly twenty five years of continuous civil was 
had ravaged the entire county.  Roads were in disrepair, buildings mostly 
destroyed, water and electricity sporadic and mostly non-existent.  Economically, 
there was no national currency, only various regional currencies printed by 
regional warlords, no central bank, no treasury, no tax collection system, no civil 
service, and the judicial system was either weak or non-existent, and almost 
always corrupt.  Afghanistan’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2002 was 
between $150 – 180 per capita, excluding poppy and narcotics.  Between 60 and 
80 percent of the population lived below the United Nations severe poverty line of 
$1 a day.69  In 1996, the last year of accurate measurements in Afghanistan for 
the United Nations’ Human Development Index, it ranked 169 out of 174, and 
things have only gotten worse.  The average life expectancy is just above 40, over 
half of children under five are malnourished, and infant mortality, and literacy 
rates are among the worst in the world70  Additionally, the many years of conflict 
revitalized the traditional tribalism and resistance to strong central governments, 
widespread banditry, multiple and competing militias and severe ethnic tension 
and hatred. 
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After the fall of Kabul to the Northern Alliance and Operation Enduring 
Freedom forces, the United Nations held a conference in Bonn, Germany.  The 
major western powers, Afghanistan’s neighbors and countries within the region, 
and representatives from the major groups in Afghanistan attended.  Pashtuns, 
the largest ethnic group in Afghanistan and historically most powerful, were not 
received favorably at Bonn.71  This was primarily because many of the Pashtuns 
supported Taliban, in fact the Taliban was made-up almost exclusively of 
Pashtuns.  The fact that the Taliban were mostly Ghilzai Pashtuns and the 
Pashtuns at Bonn were Durrani, their arch rivals, was a nuance that many did not 
yet understand.72  Northern Alliance, on the other hand, were primarily was Tajiks, 
Uzbeks, and Hazara, all ethnic minorities in Afghanistan, but they were on the 
winning side of the war.  As a result of their “victor” status, and their clear anti-
Taliban credentials, they were over represented and supported by international 
actors at Bonn73 
At Bonn, for various reasons, it was decided to support a new government 
in Afghanistan rather than temporary put the country under UN control as in 
Kosovo and Bosnia.  This approach required significant resources to rebuild 
government immediately.  As such, the United States and the international 
community decide to focus on building the capacity of Afghanistan government, to 
empower it to control countryside and do its own work, rather than providing the 
services themselves.  Major western powers would take responsibility for specific 
sectors and provide training for the government.  The United States was assigned 
the Afghan National Army (ANA) and border forces, the United Kingdom trained 
and equipped the counternarcotics forces, Italy was put in charge of the judicial 
system, and Germany the national police.   
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Procedures for establishing a transitional government and the process for a 
more permanent establishment were also developed at Bonn.  A 30-member 
interim administration, headed by Hamid Karzai would run the country temporarily.  
In June 2002 there would be a nation-wide emergency loya jirga which would pick 
a follow-on government until a constitution was written and approved and national 
elections were held.74 
The participants at Bonn, requested the UN to “monitor and assist 
implementation in all aspects.”  In response the UN Security council passed 
UNSCR 1378 on 20 December 2001 which created a framework for international 
assistance to post war Afghanistan.  The resolution committed the UN to establish 
an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in the capital region of Kabul 
and to assist the government in rebuilding and reestablishing government 
institutions and national structures and rebuilding the economy. 75   This was 
followed by UNSCR 1401 on 28 March 2002 which instructed the UN Assistance 
Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) told to oversee “all UN activities in the country, 
promote national reconciliation, fulfill Bonn taskings, and manage UN 
humanitarian, relief and reconstruction activities.”76 
2. Political Sector  
Since the overthrow of the Taliban regime over seven years ago, 
Afghanistan has started a process of political development and reform through a 
program of state-building.  Through the process described in the Bonn Agreement, 
the government of Afghanistan has made significant accomplishments.77  A 30-
member interim administration was established, an international peacekeeping 
force was authorized, and an interim constitution was established.  Since then, a 
permanent constitution was adopted by a United Nations administered national 
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convention, establishing a president and a bi-cameral legislature with presidential 
impeachment and veto powers over cabinet officials. 78   Peaceful presidential 
elections in October 2004 and parliamentary elections in November 2005 resulted 
in Hamid Karzai winning 55.4% of the vote, and his closet rival assuming the 
speaker position in parliament.  President Karzai, a Pashtun tribal leader who 
draws his support historically from the Pashtun south, and initially faced “loyal 
opposition” from the Northern Alliance political leader, and pre-Taliban President 
Burhannudin Rabbani.79   
However, flaws within the political system, namely the Single Non-
Transferable Vote (SNTV) resulted in a parliament that is not responsible and 
accountable to the constituents.  Additionally, the presidential elections were 
structured in such a way that President Karzai was not elected by over half of the 
Afghans, but rather, nearly 100% of the Pashtuns.  In other words, he is not a 
national candidate, but the candidate supported by the largest, solidified voting 
bloc.80  After Bonn, the Pashtun felt underrepresented.  As the traditional rulers, 
they maintained the presidency with Karzai, but many felt the key important 
positions in his government went to other ethnic groups.81   
After the Bonn agreement, the government of Afghanistan failed to extend 
its control over regional and provincial government organizations in all parts of the 
country.  As a result, local police, administrators, and the judicial system are more 
responsive to the regional warlords, criminal elements, and power brokers than to 
the central government.  This serves to decrease government capability, the 
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delivery of goods and services, reduces security, all of which decreases the 
legitimacy of the central government, public confidence in government, and 
reconstruction and development efforts.82 
3. Military Sector 
Unfortunately, the relatively successful, albeit flawed, political sector was 
not accompanied by economic, social or security advances.  Arguing that an 
abundance of international aid to Bosnia and Kosovo made those societies reliant 
on foreign money and troops, the US administration promoted a limited footprint in 
the reconstruction phase.83  The US sought to limit the manning, geographic 
responsibility and functions of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), 
discouraged NATO involvement, and rejected peacekeeping roles for the US 
military forces which were conducting counterterrorism operations. 84  
Responsibility for security was given to regional warlords, many of whom were 
used to fight the Taliban forces in the early stages of Operation Enduring 
Freedom, until a permanent, professional Afghan army was established.85   
Initial ISAF was approximately 5,000 troops under the command of the 
United Kingdom, and stationed in Kabul.  They were restrained by their limited 
mandate from the United Nations and rarely ventured out of the capital.  The 
United States and remaining coalition forces from Operation Enduring Freedom 
number around 8,000, and continued anti-Taliban and al Qaeda operations.  The 
United States resisted any stabilization and reconstruction role for their military 
forces initially for several reasons.  Primarily the President and his advisors 
wanted to break the pattern of larger and larger nation building projects of past 
administrations.  Additionally, there were the difficulties of logistical support for 
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nation-wide deployment, and the concern that the country did not want to tie down 
a lot of troops, there was going to be more to come in the ‘war on terror.”86   
Another concern of the United States leaderships was a justified fear that 
the “legendary xenophobia” would cause resistance to US troops nation-wide, as 
was experienced by the Soviet Union after their initial control of the urban areas.  
However, experience showed the US and international forces were accepted and 
well received throughout the country.  So to, were the 5,000 ISAF troops keeping 
the peace in Kabul, in fact, they were trusted more than Afghan police in some 
cases.87  
In terms of comparison, in the Spring of 2002, the ISAF forces equated to 
0.18 peacekeepers per 1,000 Afghans, which is more than 100 times less than 
the force used in the Balkans.  In Bosnia the ratio was 18.6 peacekeepers per 
1,000 and in Kosovo it was 20 peacekeepers per 1,000. 88   In the case of 
Afghanistan, even if Operation Enduring Freedom forces are included in the 
numbers, the international peacekeeping force was still 50 times less than used in 
the recent past. 
Initially, the ANA and Karzai’s central government were perceived as 
legitimate, although they held little real power throughout the countryside.  The 
ANA had little presence outside the capital, as did ISAF.  The US forces were 
deployed in the eastern half of the country, but they had a different focus 
altogether.  As a result of the government’s limit capability, and no international 
support to maintain security nation-wide, the task was left to the regional 
strongmen.  Not only were the militia commanders and local warlords not been 
disarmed, but they were employed to provide security.  Even the major players 
retain their own private armies.  For example, Fahim Khan, at one time, the 
Minister of Defense and senior vice president had officially pledged his support to 
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the ANA, but refused to divert resources or disband his Tajik dominated militia 
who remain loyal to him, not to the state.89 
The decision to empower regional strongmen not only eroded the support 
and legitimacy of the government, it restricted the flow of aid and reconstruction.  
Despite pressure to expand security operations into countryside, the US refused 
to alter the mission of its OEF forces and would not send troops as part of ISAF, 
so no one else in the international community did either.  As an alternative they 
deployed the first Provisional Reconstruction Team (PRT) in December 2002.  
PRTs comprised of military civil affairs troops and Special Forces teams were 
sent into major cities with the mission to gain influence with financial and 
humanitarian assistance, building small-scale projects in an attempt to build good 
will and hopefully increase stability in countryside. 
In 2004 the administration started to realize the minimalist approach was 
not working and started to alter their policies; ISAF deployed into countryside, 
NATO was invited to join and eventually lead the effort, and US manning and 
funding increased, but two years were already lost.90 
4. Reconstruction Sector 
The costs of reconstruction have been adjusted over time, but the 
international community has consistently fallen short of what was required.  The 
initial needs assessment was placed at $15 billion over four years.91  However, at 
the Tokyo donor conference in January 2002 only $1.8 billion was pledged for 
2002 and $4.5 billion for the next five years, a shortfall of $10 billion.  The EU 
pledge $500 million for 2002 and the US pledged $297 million.  Japan and the 
World Bank pledged $500 million over the next two and a half years while Saudi 
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Arabian pledged $220 million over three years. 92   Calculations vary between 
organizations, but its clear that despite being the most war-ravaged country in the 
post-conflict reconstruction phase, the per-capita expenditures on Afghanistan’s 
reconstruction and stabilization are by far the lowest.  One report cites that for first 
two years of post-conflict, expenditures in Bosnia were $1390 per capita, and 
$814 for Kosovo, but in Afghanistan expenditures were only $52 per capita, with 
some countries not meeting pledges at Tokyo conference.93  This number is 
further decreased when the effects of “phantom aid” are considered.  Reports 
estimate that on the global average, at least 61 percent of aid is wasted in the 
form of “phantom aid” meaning only 39 percent, or less than $21, was actually 
spent assisting Afghans.94  As a further means of comparison, the United States’ 
pledge of a mere $500 million in first full year of Afghanistan’s redevelopment 
pales in contrast to $18 billion for Iraq’s initial redevelopment effort, a country that 
is smaller, less populated, and has significantly more infrastructure and suffered 
less damage than Afghanistan.95 In fact, in the critical 2002-2004 time frame, 
Afghanistan was the US’s least funded and manned state-building operation since 
WWII.96   
Despite additional donor conferences in Berlin in April 2004 and Kabul in 
April 2005, donations continued to fall short of the average requirement of $4 
billion per year.97  For example, in 2005 Afghanistan received a combined total of 
only $2.8 billion in aid.98  By some accounts the support felt by Afghans actually 
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decreased.  By the end of 2006, after subtracting the cost of building the “ring 
road” from Kabul to Kandahar, the average US aid to Afghanistan over the five 
year period was only $13 per capita.99 
In February 2006 key donor countries met in London.  There the 
government of Afghanistan presented the Afghanistan Compact which was to 
replace the Bonn Agreement in describing revised political benchmarks, and also 
presented the Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS).  This 
document, for the first time, tied each individual requirement, as determined by 
the Afghan government, to specific “pillars” of long and short-term 
development.100  The ANDS also puts a dollar cost on addressing the issues.  The 
previous costing exercise, summarized in Securing Afghanistan’s Future in 2004, 
put the seven year cost at $27.6 billion.101  Two years into that projection, the 
ANDS with its significantly more specific and detailed approach, fine-tunes the 
requirements to $19.8 billion for the remaining five years.102  The ANDS specifies 
three “pillars” to the country’s overall progress, which are further divided into eight 
sectors: Security, Good Governance, Economic and Social Development, 
Infrastructure and Natural Resources, Education, Health, Agriculture and Rural 
Development, Social Protection, Economic Governance and Private Sector 
Development.103 
Not only was international monetary assistance in short supply, but the 
personnel and expertise needed to successfully coordinate and execute the effort 
were never provided.  Unlike Bosnia’s Office of the High Representative or the 
robust UN presence in Kosovo under UNMIK there is no overarching international 
agency managing Afghanistan’s recovery.  Additionally, with no dominant military 
presence with nation-wide responsibility for security to fill the coordination role, 
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the job fell to the Afghan government.  Although its capabilities have increased 
dramatically in the past year, initially the interim and follow-on governments of 
Afghanistan were ill-equipped and ill-trained to oversee such a large effort.  
UNAMA, who was officially tasked with the overarching coordination effort, was 
initial very small, and it spent the first six months organizing the Loya Jirga.  Even 
now the size capability and scope of responsibility pale in comparison to 
UNMIK.104  As a result of no overarching framework or lead organization on the 
civil assistance side, coordination become very ineffective, inefficient, ad hoc, and 
dependent on personal relationships. 
5. Current Challenges and Threats 
Due to a lack of resources and infrastructure, the Karzai government is 
unable to expand security, redevelopment, and rule of law into the countryside.  
Additionally, the authority that does exist is generally seen as corrupt.  In general, 
the US effort to increase the capacity of Afghanistan’s government has failed in 
several critical areas, including roads and infrastructure, redevelopment projects, 
health, electricity, and justice.105   
Afghanistan has not seen a relapse into war country-wide, but potentially 
war-weariness among the population may be a factor of stability in the country.  
Despite this war-weariness, the absence of the central government has fostered 
the reemergence of the Taliban to the point that currently a low intensity conflict 
rages in eastern and southern Afghanistan between the government and its allies 
and a reconstituted Taliban and other jihadi .  
Post-conflict recovery of Afghanistan remains precarious and the increase 
in violence in certain regions makes reconstruction efforts even more difficult.  In 
the southern and eastern provinces of Afghanistan, the continuing insurgency has 
seen an increase in tactics borrowed from Iraq such as suicide bombing and 
attacks on police and army targets with an ever increasing disregard for collateral 
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damage.106  The ever-present low-intensity conflict and the insecurity it generates 
forms a formidable challenge to peace and stability in both direct and indirect 
ways. 
Increasing the pace of improvements in the political, security and 
reconstruction phases of redevelopment are of critical importance when 
considering the emerging threats to the country.  After several years of relative 
calm, the Taliban has re-emerged to challenge the strength of the government.107  
The significance and power of the Taliban are debated, but it cannot be denied.108  
In fact, U.S. National Intelligence Director, at the time, John Negroponte cited the 
rise of the Taliban as the biggest threat US interests in Afghanistan.109  While 
2004 is often used as the initial re-emergence of the Taliban, significant gains 
were made in 2006 and 2007.  Prior to 2006 engagements with the Taliban were 
fairly limited and Taliban violence was at relatively low levels.  However, Lt Gen 
Karl Eikenberry, at the time, the senior US commander in Afghanistan reported 
that between 2005 and 2006 suicide attacks quadrupled, armed attacks tripled, 
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remotely denoted bombings doubled.  This increased violence resulted in over 
4,000 deaths, the worst casualty rate since 2001.110 
The missteps by the international community and the United States that led 
to the Taliban resurgence are well documented and focus primarily the 
commitment of too few personnel (military forces and civilian facilitators and 
coordinators) and too few resources.111  It is therefore, the correction of these 
previous flawed approaches that is receiving the greatest attention. 
Addressing the previous shortcomings in stabilization and reconstruction 
strategies is also crucial when considering where the base of the Taliban support 
stems from and how to best counter the Taliban appeal.  Current resurgence of 
the Taliban does not stem from widespread hatred for the central government 
among the population.  In fact, people do not want the Taliban to come back, but 
they feel increasingly disappointed and disillusioned by the government’s inability 
to protect them and deliver on reconstruction. 112  "We have been with the Taliban 
and have seen their cruelty. People don't want them back." says a tribal elder, 
who was also angered by corruption within the government and its distance from 
the needs of the people.113  Despite their frustration, they still consider President 
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Karzai the country's best leader in 30 years.114  Rather than direct support, the 
villager–Taliban relationship is one of pragmatic acceptance.  When the Taliban 
infiltrates a village the incentive for the villagers is to tolerate their presence, 
rather than risk their lives defending a central government that can neither protect 
them nor advance their well-being.115  Likewise the growing implementation of 
Islamic law, or sharia, is out of necessity rather than conviction.  The 
government’s judicial system is either non-existent or corrupt and cannot 
administer justice.  Community leaders are demanding sharia, not as an 
alternative to secular law, but to corruption and lawlessness.116  In general, the 
lack of the government presence and services, inability to provide adequate 
security, improve living conditions and fight corruption is creating a vacuum power 
and level of apathy in which the Taliban is not yet garnering direct support but is 
allowed to operate.117   
The heart of the Taliban network is actually in Pakistan, primarily the Tribal 
Areas safe haven, from which they received most of their funding, personnel, 
armament and logistical support.118  Afghan people, like most, simply want peace 
and stability, preferably provided by their own central government, or US/NATO 
forces, unable to provide these basic necessities will increase their acceptance of, 
if not support for, the Taliban.119 
C. SUMMARY 
The United States, and the international community, in general, are 
increasingly finding themselves faced with states that can be considered failed or 
failing, or in the midst of recovering from failure.  In the past, the typical reaction 
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was minor humanitarian assistance, usually through NGOs.  Since these states 
posed little, if any, threat to national security, or national interests, little attention 
was paid to them.  In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, failed or failing states 
have become very prominent in national security calculations because of their 
possibility of degenerating into terrorist states or safe-havens.  How to prevent a 
state from failing, and how to rebuild those that have failed are now considered 
vital national security interests.  Unfortunately for policy makers, planners, and 
soldiers in the field, there is little consensus within the various academic and 
epistemic communities, who have been studying the problem long before, on how 
to best accomplish these goals.   
There is a long list of varying opinions on how to best handle issues such 
as selecting critical sectors, sequencing of development, central or local control, 
foreign or domestic execution, foreign or domestic priorities, desired end-state, 
etc.  Although the list of what experts do agree-on is relatively small, it can be 
useful.  There is general agreement that successful post-conflict reconstruction 
requires a holistic effort, encompassing many sectors of society (exactly which 
ones and their relative importance is open to opinion).  Additionally, there is a 
general consensus that security must come first.  Some studies also list unity of 
command, or at least an overarching coordination agency, and a strong initial 
commitment of manpower, materials and dollars as key components to success.  
In Afghanistan various theories are being put to the test with mixed results.  
First, and perhaps most importantly, the state was put under local control, instead 
of a UN protectorate through its transition period.  Additionally, political recovery 
was initiated at the national level first, creating a central government with no 
provincial or local administrative structures to support it.  With respect to 
resources, not only did the US military elect to pursue a “light footprint” strategy, 
national governments individually tried to “go cheap” with limited pledges and 
collectively did the same by not providing the resources, manpower, or mandate 
to any one single international organization to manage and oversee the entire 
effort.  As a result, the interim government, with no civil-service corps or 
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infrastructure after 25 years of civil war, was given the task to manage the 
international reconstruction effort by default.  The secondary effect of limited 
international presence is the reliance on warlords and regional strongmen, which 
have delayed the restoration of security, eroded the legitimacy of the central 
government and restricted the flow of aid and reconstruction.  
As the United States and the international community as a whole, attempt 
to address some of the mistakes in their initial strategy by committing more 
military forces, expanding their mandate, and adequately funding the overall 
reconstruction effort, it is important to assess whether the earlier approaches 
were valid and just undermanned and underfunded, or the increased resources 
need to be accompanied by a wholesale change of strategy.   
 40
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III. DISTRICT LEVEL ANALYSIS 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This study employs a variety of databases, assessments, and products to 
compare the overall reconstruction effort with levels of security, prosperity and 
increased development.  This chapter will attempt to measure the effectiveness of 
the current stability and reconstruction strategy through extensive quantitative 
analysis of the aid programs themselves, and comparing that to increased (or 
decreased) levels of security.  Twenty two different districts nation-wide were 
selected as the units of analysis.  The quantitative measurements used in this 
chapter include the Afghanistan Country Stability Picture (ACSP) and the United 
Nations Threat Assessment Map series, both of which are explained below.  By 
comparing the risk level in individual districts as assessed by the United Nations 
over time, and the level of the stabilization and reconstruction effort over time as 
measured by the ACSP, the chapter discovers some clear correlations, although 
causation is not yet substantiated. 
The majority of the analysis conducted stems from the use of these 
databases, and therefore significant attention is dedicated to detailing the specific 
analytical steps taken along the way to reach each conclusion.  Without these 
detailed explanations reproducible results would be impossible because the data 
used in the analysis differs in significant ways from the original sources. 
1. Background on ACSP 
In order to measure and asses the international stabilization and 
reconstruction effort in the specific districts, the Afghanistan Country Stability 
Picture (ACSP), version VII, with an effective date of June, 2007 was utilized.  
Despite the availability of other more widely known databases, they all contained 
inherent limitations that would affect the quality of the data and the utility of the 
formatting.  For example, the United Nations maintains separate Donor 
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Assistance Databases for numerous countries, including Afghanistan.120  While 
this product is very interactive, it provides limited details as to the location of 
specific projects.  As a result, using this database to track the number or type of 
projects within a specific district was not feasible.  Additionally, when searching 
for activities funded and started in 2006 and 2007 the database returned only 30 
projects and $6 million for the entire country; which was clearly not representative 
of the actual effort.121  Another potential database is the product published by the 
Afghanistan Ministry of Finance. 122   While this database provided a useful 
overview and macro-level assessment of the effort, it also did not have detailed 
geographical information that would facilitate the measuring of the level and type 
of reconstruction effort at the district level.123   
The ACSP was initially developed by the International Security Assistance 
Force (ISAF) and is designed to pull data from various databases and display 
them geographically on regional maps of Afghanistan.  According to the highly 
respected Afghanistan Research and Evaluation Unit the ACSP is a “geographic 
database of over 45,000 reconstruction and development projects across 
Afghanistan.”124  The ACSP “merges data from Afghan government ministries, 
donors, IO/NGOs and provincial reconstruction teams across the full spectrum of 
the Afghan National Development Strategy Sectors.”125   
Aside from its many mapping functions and interactive utility, the ACSP VII 
reconstruction and development data is stored within three separate databases:  
                                                 
120 Access on-line via: http://aacadad.synisys.com/idmafg/idmMain/loader.asp (accessed 27 
June 2007). 
121 Results of queries run on 25 July 2007.  E-mail inquiries to the listed webmaster and six 
different UN points-of-contact at various offices to resolve this discrepancy went unanswered. 
122 Access on-line via: http://203.215.43.35/html/dad/msaccessdad.html (accessed 16 March 
2008).  
123 Additionally, the data was only retrievable through individual queries, in a sense, only the 
end-user interface was available.  This format prevented access to the master database, which 
was required in order to accomplish the desired type of analysis and the level of detail. 
124 Afghanistan Research Newsletter.  (Kabul, Afghanistan: Afghanistan Research and 
Evaluation Unit) no 13, (April 2007): 5. 
125 Ibid., 5. 
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Small-scale Projects, PRT Projects, and Strategic Projects.  Combined, these 
databases provide extensive details on the location, status, timeline, and involved 
agencies on over 47,000 projects and over $14 billion in aid money.126   
2. Background on UN Risk Assessment Maps 
The United Nations risk assessment maps, developed by the United 
Nations Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS), are considered some of the 
best, unclassified, unbiased, judgments of the level of Taliban influence, (or at 
least the level of violence).  They are used by “newspapers of record”, 
international research and policy NGOs, and individual Afghanistan scholars 
alike. 127   They utilize a consistent methodology from 2002 to the present, 
characterizing the risk, and therefore level of Taliban control, for each district, 
nation-wide into one of three categorizes:  Low Risk / Permissive Environment, 
Medium Risk / Unstable Environment, and High Risk / Volatile Environment.  In 
2005, as a response to the deteriorating situation in parts of the country, the 
UNDSS made the addition of the Extreme Risk / Hostile Environment category.   
The maps used were obtained from either the Afghanistan Information 
Management Services (AIMS) or the New York Times website and track the 
increase in violent districts from 2002 to the present, measured in annual intervals, 
typically in June or July.128  The 2006 map is shown in Figure 2. 
                                                 
126 The ACSP allows access to the raw data relating to reconstruction from three different 
Microsoft Excel files.  This access made the data more easily manipulated and presented with 
greater utility.  This chapter utilized only data from the small-scale projects and PRT projects.  As 
such, the methodology section focuses primarily on those databases.  Later chapters utilize the 
strategic projects data and discuss it at length in the methodology sections. 
127 See David Rohde, David E. Sanger, and Carlotta Gall, "How the 'Good War' in Afghanistan 
Went Bad." New York Times,  12 August 2007 and Countering Afghanistan’s Insurgency: No 
Quick Fixes. International Crisis Group, 2 November 2006, Asia Report No 123. and Thomas H. 
Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” China and 
Eurasia Forum Quarterly 5, no 2, 2007, 93-129. 





Figure 2.   2006 UN Risk Assessment Map 
 
A visual inspection of the risk assessment map reveals some interesting 
trends.  First, it clearly shows the greatest concentration of Taliban strength is in 
the East and South, which corresponds to the traditional Pashtun homelands.  
Additionally, most of the Extreme risk districts are either on the border or are in 
close proximity to Pakistan and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).  
The combination of popular support in the FATA and extremely rugged terrain 
make these ideal bases for operations.  The risk level surrounding the major 
roadways are also interesting.  In the south east, specifically the section of the 
ring road connecting Kandahar and Kabul, the risk levels are usually less than the 
surrounding areas, presumably because of the greater concentration of ISAF 
forces in this region.  In the northwestern part of the country, where ISAF has a 
more limited presence the roads and major transit routes from Turkmenistan 
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represent a source of funding for the Taliban through tolls and charges for safe-
passage.  As a result the threat on the roads in the west and north are typically 
higher than the surrounding areas. 
Additionally, in 2007 the UNDSS defined a High Abduction Risk Area 
(HARA).  This was in response to a high number of kidnappings of NGO workers 
and specific threats from Taliban leaders.  Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban’s senior 
commander in the south is quoted as saying “We certainly target all those who 
work for the UN, the US, and Karzai. We are attempting to target everyone that 
works for the UN and are determined to target all UN organizations and branches, 
considering them similar to US organizations.”129 Mullah Dadullah was killed by a 
United States air strike on 12 May 2007 and was replaced by his older brother, 
Mansur Dadullah, who continues the kidnapping strategy, noting “Of course, 
kidnapping is a very successful policy and I order all my mujahideen to kidnap 
foreigners of any nationality wherever they find them and then we should do the 
same kind of deal.”130  According to UN figures within the HARA there were 70 
attacks, 69 abductions and 41 workers killed in the first seven months of 2007.131  
The risk is so great in these areas the UNDSS recommended increasing the 
security requirement from two escort vehicles (and in some cases no escort 
vehicles), to include two additional armored vehicles for movement of UN staff.132  
Because the HARA is a new development, it does not provide a historical 
comparison to track over time.  The August 2007 HARA map is shown in Figure 3.   
                                                 
129 C.S. Harrison, Half-Year Review of the Security Situation in Afghanistan. (New York: UN 
Department of Safety and Security), 13 August 2007, Afghanistan - Topic Assessment 02/07, 5.  
130 Harrison, 5. 
131 Ibid., 6. 
132 Ibid., 5. 
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Figure 3.    2007 UN HARA Map 
 
When compared to the risk assessment map in Figure 2 the overlap with 
Extreme Risk / Hostile Environment is clear and serves to highlight the increased 
Taliban presence and threat posed by these areas.  Again, the use of the Ring 
Road is evident in the east as a means to move troops and security forces 
resulting in a few patches of low risk.  In the west, however, where there are less 
troops, the Taliban are clearly using the road to expand their influence into Farah 
and Herat provinces in the south west, and using other major arteries and trading 
routes to control the Badghis province in the north west. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Selection of Districts and Risk Assessments 
In order to accurately measure the effects of the stability and 
reconstruction effort throughout the country, several assumptions were 
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incorporated into the study.  It was assumed that government control is at its 
highest within the capital of Kabul and inordinately strong in the key urban centers.  
Likewise, the concentration of NGOs and international aid organizations would 
also be greatest in these cities.  Additionally, the effects of PRTs and military 
bases on the number and scale of projects and security levels would be non-
representatively high within their immediate geographical area.  It was assumed 
these nodes represent uncharacteristically high levels of government control, 
increased wealth, and successful reconstruction efforts.  As a result, all districts 
are outside the capital region of Kabul and districts in the north and west regions 
were also considered in reference to their proximity to PRT bases, and regional 
urban and capital centers.  These districts are, in some cases, close to, but not 
the actual districts housing the capital, urban center, or PRT.  Additionally, 
districts were selected to represent a cross-section of ethnicity, Taliban influence, 
regional affiliations, urban/rural mix, and in general terms, the overall conditions in 
Afghanistan outside the capital district of Kabul.133  The districts selected for this 
analysis were: Wor Mamay, Wazeh Khwah, Tarwah, Nish, Shah Vali Kowt, 
Khowgiani, Pachir va Agam, Daychupan, Nari, Kamdesh, Gizab, Bar Kunar, 
Ghaziabad, Naveh-ye Barakza'l, Rig (Helmand), Almar, Khvajeh Sabz Push, 
Pashtun Kowt, Navor, Shahrestan, Shulgareh, and Tulak.  Figure 4 illustrates the 
location of the selected districts on the 2006 UN Risk Assessment map. The 
complete time series from 2002-2007 of UN Risk Assessment maps, are included 
as Appendix A.  The maps have the specific districts of study outlined to increase 
the geographic awareness of the districts in question, and facilitate the annual 
comparisons.   
                                                 
133 See “District Profiles” on AIMS website: 
http://www.aims.org.af/sroot.aspx?seckeyo=52&seckeyz=38 (accessed 16 March 2008). 
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Figure 4.   UN Risk Assessment Map and Subject Districts134   
 
After utilizing the district selection methodology discussed above, each 
district’s UN risk assessment level was tracked on an annual basis from 2002 to 
2007.  A numerical value was assigned to each threat level with Low Risk / 
Permissive Environment receiving a value of 1 and Extreme Risk / Hostile 
Environment receiving a value of 4.  Each district received an annual point value 
based on its UN risk assessment.  The point values for the six year period were 
combined to develop and aggregate risk value and the districts were ordered from 
those with the highest value, or longest history of high risk, to those with the 
                                                 
134 NY Times on-line at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2007/09/01/world/middleeast/20070901_AFGHAN_GRAPHIC.
html (accessed 16 march 2008).  District overlay is a relative approximation and solely the work of 
the author who bears responsibility for any inaccuracy. 
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lowest value, or shortest (or zero) history of high risk.  Table 1 illustrates the UN 
risk assessment and its point value by year for each of the districts.   
 
UN Risk Assessment Values  
1 = Low 4 =  Extreme 
District Region 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
        
Wor Mamay                East 3 3 3 4 4 4 
Wazeh Khwah            East 3 3 3 4 4 4 
Tarwah               East 3 3 3 4 4 4 
Nish             South 3 3 3 4 4 4 
Shah Vali Kowt         South 3 3 3 4 4 4 
Khowgiani               East 1 3 3 3 4 4 
Pachir va Agam        South 1 3 3 3 4 4 
Daychupan               South 1 1 3 4 4 4 
Nari                East 1 1 3 4 4 4 
Kamdesh                East 1 1 3 4 4 4 
Gizab               East 1 1 1 3 4 4 
Bar Kunar                   East 1 1 1 3 4 4 
Ghaziabad                  East 1 1 1 3 4 4 
Naveh-ye Barakza'l   South 1 1 1 1 4 3 
Rig (Helmand)           South 1 1 1 1 3 4 
Almar              North 1 1 1 1 2 2 
Khvajeh Sabz Push   North 1 1 1 1 2 2 
Pashtun Kowt            North 1 1 1 1 2 2 
Navor               East 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Shahrestan                 East 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Shulgareh              North 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Tulak              West 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Table 1.   UN Risk Assessments by District  
 
Sorting and displaying the results in this manner highlights three primary 
trends.  First, all of the Extreme risk districts are either in the south or east.  
Second, the overwhelming majority of the Low and Moderate risk districts are in 
the North or West.  Thirdly, with the exception of Naveh-ye Barakza’l in the south, 
the risk level in every district has become progressively worse, no districts show 




support the assessment that the Taliban is strongest in the south and east are 
moving to consolidate their control of those regions and slowing expanding into 
the north and west. 
After utilizing the district selection methodology discussed above, each 
district’s UN risk assessment level was tracked on an annual basis from 2002 to 
2007.  A numerical value was assigned to each threat level with Low Risk / 
Permissive Environment receiving a value of 1 and Extreme Risk / Hostile 
Environment receiving a value of 4.  Each district received an annual point value 
based on its UN risk assessment.  The point values for the six year period were 
combined to develop and aggregate risk value and the districts were ordered from 
those with the highest value, or longest history of high risk, to those with the 
lowest value, or shortest (or zero) history of high risk.  Table 1 illustrates the UN 
risk assessment and its point value by year for each of the districts.   
2. District-Level Reconstruction Data 
a. Small Scale Projects and PRT Projects 
The ACSP data is divided into three parts: PRT projects, small-scale 
projects, and strategic infrastructure projects.  Both PRT projects and small-scale 
projects contain relatively small-scale efforts such as digging a well, repairing a 
building, conducting limited health care outreach.  The primary differentiation 
between the two is that “PRT projects” are those completed by Provincial 
Reconstruction Teams, and small-scale projects includes efforts by the 
government of Afghanistan, foreign governments, international NGOs, and 
countless aid organizations.  These projects are often focused on specific villages 
and typically only affect the Afghans that live in the immediate vicinity.  The 
strategic project database is comprised of extremely large projects dedicated to 
security and infrastructure, such as building the “Ring Road” or equipping portions 
of the Afghan National Army.  Projects from this database are much larger in 
scope and often affect the entire province or region.  As a result, less than 45 
percent of the projects list a specific district.  This is not unexpected and 
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represents one trade-off when analyzing the influences at the local level; how do 
you measure the impact of a new ANA regional headquarters, or new provincial 
police station on a specific district?  For these reasons, in order to more 
accurately measure the impact of stability and reconstruction at the district level, 
the strategic project database was not utilized.  It is used, however, and 
discussed at greater length in later chapters covering provincial-level analysis.  
b. Quality Control Methods 
In the analysis, only the ACSP small-scale projects and PRT 
projects databases were used to create unique spreadsheets and graphs by 
further refining the data.  Despite coming from a variety of sources and manually 
entered and tracked, the databases proved to have a very high degree of 
accuracy and fidelity.  In its entirety the small-scale project database contained 
38,836 projects valued at $3,031,632,896 while the PRT database contained 
8,707 projects valued at $699,592,997.  First, and most obviously, the data was 
sorted by specific district, resolving various spelling errors and irregularities and 
repeated or duplicated data entries due to software anomalies.  Any project not 
associated with a specific district was excluded from the dataset.   
Since tracking the reconstruction and stabilization effort over time is 
vitally important to the study, each project had to be placed within a specific 
calendar year, or “List Year.”  On the premise that a project had the most impact 
once it was completed, the List Year category, developed for this study, is based 
on the completion date, when available.  If a completion date could not be 
determined and the project status was listed as Complete or Ongoing, then the 
start date was used to set the List Year.  If no start date or end date was available 
then the List Year for that project was assigned as “M”; signifying multiple and/or 
unknown.  For calculations in this chapter addressing the aggregate effort 
between 2004 and 2007, projects with a List Year value of M are included; 
however, for year-to-year comparisons they are excluded since they cannot 
accurately and reliably be associated with any specific calendar year. 
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Additionally, the databases were screened for unreliable entries, 
and those that contained incomplete or inaccurate data were eliminated.  Projects 
that contained obvious inaccuracies or lack of information in the District, Status, 
Start Date and End Date fields were considered unreliable.  These entries while 
not actually deleted from the database, are identified by an “X” in the “List Year” 
category, so they are easily identifiable and easily eliminated from representation 
and analysis.  Using a unique quantitative and qualitative matrix, each specific 
project in both databases (over 47,000 entries) were assigned a specific “List 
Year” value representing either a specific calendar year, or an “M” if a specific 
calendar year could not be determined, or an “X” if the data was deemed too 
unreliable (as discussed above).  Some examples of the key data points used and 
the resultant ‘List Year” are shown in Table 2.  
 
Determination of List Year Values 
Status Start Date End Date List Year 
Blank Blank Blank X 
Complete or Ongoing Blank Blank M 
Complete or Ongoing Blank 2005 2005 
Ongoing 2006 Blank 2006 
Complete 2006 2007 2007 
Ongoing 2008 2010 M 
Table 2.   List Year Matrix 
 
As mentioned previously, the databases proved remarkable 
accurate and complete.  Only 6.7 percent of the projects in the PRT database 
proved unreliable (List Year value of X) representing only 3.1 percent of the cost, 
while only 6.1 percent of the projects and 1.9 percent of the cost of the small-
scale reconstruction projects were unreliable.  Likewise, of the usable data that 
remained, a specific calendar year was determined for 68.0 percent of the PRT 
projects and 89.7 percent of the small-scale projects. 
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In addition to screening for district identification and specific dates of 
the work, projects were analyzed based on their status.  It was assumed that 
reconstruction projects in various stages of the paperwork process (identified, 
planned, funded, etc.) at the provincial headquarters have no effect on the 
population and the situation on the ground, and thus were not considered in the 
analysis, only projects where the status was labeled as “Complete” or “On-going” 
were considered, in other words, projects that the people could actually see and 
use.  Unless otherwise stated the data presented is for complete or ongoing 
projects only, however, throughout the attached analysis there is often the 
delineation between “Complete or Ongoing” with values of “Y” (yes) or “blank” 
(no).  These are included primarily because most of the figures concerning the 
reconstruction effort in current literature do not differentiate between the two, and 
by including these figures, we can compare the reliability and fidelity of our overall 
database with other projects.  In other words, the research does not become so 
specialized in cannot be contrasted with other efforts to ensure its validity.  The 
volume of complete or ongoing projects does not reflect on the validity of the 
databases, but rather on how much is actually getting accomplished in the field.  
According to the PRT database, of the usable data (entries with a List Year other 
than X) 87.5 percent were listed as either complete or ongoing while the small-
scale project database listed 86.5 percent of the usable data as complete or 
ongoing. 
In summary, the district level reconstruction and stabilization data 
presented in this chapter and used for the district analysis contains only entries 
that were positively identified within the specific district, labeled as “complete” or 
“on-going”, and associated with either a specific calendar year, or over a series of 
multiple years. 
c. Number of Projects as a Metric 
Measuring the level of effort in the stabilization and reconstruction 
within a specific district can be very subjective and open to interpretation.  A 
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critical question is what metric is the most accurate – the number of projects, the 
cost of projects, or the total man-hours, for example – to measure the level of 
effort, and what metric is widely available?  The databases contained values only 
for the cost and specific numbers of projects.  Statistical analysis supported using 
the number of projects as the measure of reconstruction when utilizing the PRT 
and small-scale project databases.  It is reasonable that charity workers, NGOs, 
aid organizations and others involved in the reconstruction effort, have little to no 
cost for specific small-scale projects such as digging a well or repairing a 
marketplace.  A significant amount of their inputs are manpower and utilizing 
donated equipment and supplies.  Likewise, the projects by the PRTs incur little to 
no cost, especially if the materials are already on hand or donated.  Statistically, 
the number of projects also proved the most illustrative metric.  After eliminating 
unreliable data, of the 4,910 projects in the PRT database listed as Complete, 
25.3 percent had zero cost.  In the small-scale database, 34.2 percent of the 
15,030 completed projects are listed as zero cost.  Whether the cost was actually 
zero, or the data was inadvertently omitted, is secondary to the fact that in the 
data set presented, if cost was used as a measure of effort, it would ignore 
anywhere from 25 to 34 percent of the projects.  Additionally, this trend was 
projected to continue as 24.5 percent of the planned PRT projects were listed as 
zero cost and 20.6 percent of the small-scale projects were projected to have zero 
cost.  As a result, for the smaller projects, such as those in the PRT and small-
scale project database, the number of projects, not the cost of projects is used as 
the metric to measure the effort. 
d. Combining the Databases 
The projects measured by the PRT and small-scale databases are 
very similar, the primary difference being who is doing the reconstruction.  Since 
this study is concerned with what type and to what level the reconstruction is 
being accomplished and is not concerned with which actors are actually doing the 
reconstruction, there was a theoretical basis for combining the two databases.  
Statistically, this proved to be a sound approach.  Both databases had very similar 
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levels of accuracy and fidelity.  In the PRT database 93.3 percent of the project 
entries were considered reliable, and of those, 71.2 percent could be traced to a 
specific calendar year, resulting in 28.8 percent of the projects being assigned a 
List Year value of M.  In the small-scale projects, 93.9 percent of the total list was 
usable, and a specific calendar year was assignable in 95.2 percent of the entries.  
By combining the databases a more accurate picture of the overall reconstruction 
effort is created without corrupting the dataset or introducing decreased levels of 
accuracy.  The combined dataset results in 38,657 individual projects, nation-wide 
that are either complete or ongoing, of which 90.8% are attributed to a specific 
calendar year.  In this new, combined dataset, the decision to use the number of 
projects and not the cost of the projects as the measure of the reconstruction 
effort is still valid.  If the cost of projects was utilized, 21.3 percent of the projects 
would be ignored due to zero cost, and specific calendar year accuracy would 
drop to 73.9 percent. 
e. Final Dataset  
A condensed table showing the scope of the combined database by 
ISAF Regional Commands and List Year is included as Table 3.  An expanded 
version of the database showing the individual provinces is included as Appendix 
B. 
Combined Small-Scale Projects and PRT Projects Database 






Ongoing 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 M X Total
RC Capital Yes 47 97 316 515 301 197 707   2180
  No    20 25 8 16 120 226 415
RC Capital 
Total   47 97 336 540 309 213 827 226 2595
RC East Yes 61 597 3101 5974 4588 1597 638   16556
  No 1 6 123 214 226 142 352 800 1864
RC East 
Total   62 603 3224 6188 4814 1739 990 800 18420
RC North Yes 18 286 1777 2852 2677 1191 599   9400
  No   1 90 104 107 172 317 609 1400
RC North 
Total   18 287 1867 2956 2784 1363 916 609 10800
RC South Yes 104 166 675 1133 882 588 934   4482
  No 76 9 120 134 190 69 1303 1011 2912
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RC South 
Total   180 175 795 1267 1072 657 2237 1011 7394
RC West Yes  32 139 1085 1828 1647 550 590   5871
  No 3 16 70 121 999 87 125 255 1676
RC West 
Total   35 155 1155 1949 2646 637 715 255 7547
Grand Total   342 1317 7377 12900 11625 4609 5685 2901 46756
 
Table 3.   Combined Dataset of Small-Scale Projects 
 
The table clearly shows an overwhelming effort in the eastern 
regional command.  As the last region that to come under ISAF/NATO control, it 
remained under sole US control the longest and while currently under the ISAF 
command, the regional command is run by the US and the outposts are almost 
exclusively manned by US forces.  Additionally, this region has the most PRTs, 
the most manpower, and the concentration of US Operation Enduring Freedom 
forces which operate outside of ISAF control.   In sum, the eastern region 
represents the earliest, longest, and largest concentration of US forces.  Outside 
of the eastern region the reconstruction effort is strongest in the north and west 
regions and weakest in the south.  This reflects both the permissive environment 
in the north and west, which attracts more NGOs and aid agencies and also 
explains why the Pashtuns in the south feel their needs are not being addressed 
and therefore are more receptive to the Taliban. 
This revised and edited reconstruction database, was scanned for 
all the projects located within the specific districts under study in this chapter.  The 
data was then collated by year, status, and specific ANDS sector.  Table 4 shows 
the results of the searches for all ANDS sectors combined.  A total of 894 projects 
across all the ANDS sectors are listed as either complete or ongoing between 
2002 and 2007.  This highly detailed and refined dataset data formed the basis of 





District                    Region List Year Total 
 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 M  
Wor Mamay                East         3   4 7
Wazeh Khwah            East    7 1 6  7 21
Tarwah                       East        3 3
Nish                          South     7   9 16
Shah Vali Kowt         South   4 1 5 11 1 6 28
Khowgiani                   East   14 11 8 9 1 7 50
Pachi va Agam           East   7 8 4 16  3 38
Daychupan               South        6 6
Nari                             East     2 8 10 3 23
Kamdesh                    East     6 12 4 1 23
Gizab                          East     3 1  4 8
Bar Kunar                   East      2  1 3
Ghaziabad                  East     4 5 2 3 14
Naveh-ye Barakza'I  South 3 2 1 9 8  6 29
Rig (Helmand)          South 1 3 4 25 1  7 41
Almar                        North   1 25 52 38 32 7 155
Khvajeh Sabz Push  North   1 4 8 8 4 1 26
Pashtun Kowt           North   1 35 44 36 33 12 161
Navor                          East   10 1  13 31 1 56
Shahrestan                 East    20 16 56 8 1 101
Shulgareh                  North    3 3 3 12 5 26
Tulak                          West   3 18 5 25  8 59
Grand Total 4 46 138 202 261 138 105 894
Table 4.   Dataset for District Analysis  
 
3. Population Calculations 
Utilizing the district as the unit level of analysis introduces numerous 
variables such as terrain, population density, weather, arable land, accessibility, 
local history, etc. all of which influence the appeal and effectiveness of the 
insurgent forces and reconstruction efforts.  In order to minimize some of the 
variables, “total population” was chosen as a normalizing factor.  Among other 
factors, this statistic can account in a partial manner for terrain, arable land, “rural-
ness”, accessibility and weather.  Population figures in Afghanistan as a whole, 
are somewhat unreliable, as a comprehensive census has not been conducted 
since the 1970’s, before two decades of warfare.  Reliability, increases somewhat 
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when considering district populations, which can be assessed via local shuras 
and other means.  In order to further increase reliability of the figures, population 
estimates were gathered from three different sources (ACSP, AIMS district 
profiles, and the government of Afghanistan’s Central Statistic Office) and 
averaged together. 135   Population calculations were utilized to develop the 
projects-per-capita figures that are employed in some of the later analysis.  The 
results of this research and calculations are shown in Table 5. 
 









Estimates  Average 
     
Wor Mamay                East   3 3.0 
Wazeh Khwah            East 21  19.4 20.2 
Tarwah                       East   1.7 1.7 
Nish                          South   11.3 11.3 
Shah Vali Kowt         South 36  36.4 36.2 
Khowgiani                   East 106 146.8 108 120.3 
Pachir va Agam        South 31 39.2 31.7 34.0 
Chaparhar                South 44 54.8 44.2 47.7 
Daychupan               South 45 52.8 33.1 43.6 
Nari                             East 14 15.1 13.8 14.3 
Kamdesh                    East 13 17.1 11.1 13.7 
Gizab                          East 54  55 54.5 
Bar Kunar                   East 14 15 16.4 15.1 
Ghaziabad                  East 13 14.8 7.5 11.8 
Naveh-ye Barakza'l  South 77 93.4 78 82.8 
Rig (Helmand)          South 2 13 22.1 12.4 
Almar                         North 55 116 55.8 75.6 
Khvajeh Sabz Push   North 58 84 39.9 60.6 
Pashtun Kowt            North 157 277 159.3 197.8 
Navor                        North 76 91.7 77.1 81.6 
Shahrestan                 East 107  108.9 108.0 
Shulgareh                  North 106 124.1 105.5 111.9 
Tulak                          West 41  41.3 41.2 
Table 5.   Population by District 
                                                 
135 “CSO 2003 - 2004 Population Statistics - 388 Districts” on-line at: http://www.cso-
af.net/cso/index.php?page=1&language=en (accessed 16 March 2008). 
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This table refutes the perception that Taliban support is confined to 
sparsely populated mountain districts.  Wazeh Khwah has over 20,000 people 
and Khowgiani is the second largest district in the study with over 120,000 people, 
both of which show the highest Taliban risk for over two years.  The results also 
highlight the difficulties in accurately assessing the population numbers.  The 
AIMS estimates were almost always higher than the other two, in the case of 
Almar, it was more than double.  There were also significant discrepancies 
between the ACSP figures and the CSO numbers, in some cases by over 20,000 
people.  
4. Limitations and Benefits of District-Level Approach 
There are some natural limitations to the district level analysis and the 
overall approach which must be acknowledged.  First, is that every district is 
treated as a distinct, uniform entity, there is no account for any spill-over effects 
from the neighboring areas, nor is there any differentiation or accounting for 
variables within a specific district.  Additionally, only reconstruction efforts within a 
specific district are considered.  As mentioned previously, the impact of strategic 
reconstructing efforts, such as the construction of a new provincial police 
headquarters are not measured at the district level.  Thirdly, by using the number 
of projects as the metric by which the reconstruction effort is measured, there is 
an inherent assumption that all projects have the same effect.  Every project is 
considered equal, both the resources required to complete it and in the scale and 
scope of its impact.  Lastly, as this study is concerned solely on the effect of 
reconstruction, several factors that are clearly relevant to the influence of the 
Taliban have been eliminated from the majority of the analysis, such as tribal and 
ethnic affiliations, Taliban recruiting, financing, and non-violent methodologies, 
and the effect of ANA, ISAF, and US counter-insurgency and counter-terrorist 
operations, to name a few.  
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C. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS  
1. Analysis Between Risk Assessment and Projects  
When comparing the districts in order of risk and the reconstruction effort 
within each district there are some clear correlations.  First the districts were 
placed along and X-axis with the highest risk districts on the left and the lowest 
risk districts on the right.  Then the total numbers of reconstruction projects for all 
ANDS sectors, by year, were plotted along the Y-axis.  There is an undeniable 
trend illustrating that the number of projects increased and the risk assessment 











































































































































Figure 5.   Small-Scale Projects for 22 Districts by Year 
 
Statistical analysis of this relationship resulted in an R-squared value of 
0.319, a Multiple R value of .565, and a significance factor of 0.0061.  Further 
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detailed analysis of the reconstruction effort sought to determine which sector of 
the ANDS had the greatest correlation with decreased risk level.  The Agricultural 
and Rural Development sector proved to have the greatest effect, with an R-
squared value of 0.343, a Multiple R value of .585 significant at .0041 level.  
Infrastructure and Natural Resources sector had the second most with an R-
squared value of 0.337, a Multiple R value of .580 significant at .0045 level.  
Intuitively the Security sector might be assumed to have the greatest impact; 
however, the majority of the security effort is focused at the strategic level. There 
were only 21 security projects categorized as complete or ongoing in the 22 
districts, make that variable statistically insignificant.   
As mentioned, the results above were for the aggregated values of both 
risk assessment and reconstruction projects for the time period of 2004 to 2007.  
Further analysis was conducted to examine the relationships on an annual basis, 
comparing each district’s risk assessment and the total number of projects for 
each year between 2004 and 2007.  The calculations illustrated that correlation 
was much weaker on an annual basis, resulting in an R-squared of only 0.201, a 
Multiple R value of .449 significant at .001 for all the ANDS sectors combined and 
even lower for individual sectors.   
2. Analysis on a Per-Capita Basis 
Additionally, duplicate analysis was conducted on a project per-capita 
basis as a means to normalize certain geographic and environmental factors 
between districts.  Projects per-capita were measured for all ANDS sectors 
combined and for each sector individually and were compared with risk 
assessment levels in the aggregated form and for individual years.  In all cases 
there proved to be no correlation between risk assessments and projects per-
capita with R-squared values of less than 0.1. 
3. Conclusions 
The strongest relationships discovered were the aggregated values for risk 
assessment and the reconstruction effort in the Agriculture and Rural 
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Development sector followed by the Infrastructure and Natural resources sector, 
and the combination of all ANDS sectors.  In all three cases, there is strong 
correlation showing that the number of projects increased and risk assessment 
levels decreased.   
Also significant is that these three relationships grew remarkably weaker 
when analyzed on an annual basis.  One explanation is a time-lag factor affecting 
one or both variables.  In other words, for a specific year the risk assessment 
level may decrease, but there is a time lag (in this case more than one year) 
before projects in that district increase; or just as likely, the number of projects 
may increase, but there is a lag before the projects result in a lower risk district.  
Although causation and the length of the time lag is not clear from this analysis, 
what is clear is the presence of a time lag and a strong inverse correlation 
between risk assessments and the number of projects focused on agriculture and 
rural development and infrastructure and natural resources.  
These results support several conclusions and policy implications.  The 
strong relationship between the number of projects and Taliban risk means that 
the level of effort in reconstruction can account for over 56 percent of the 
variations in risk level.  Additionally, the most important types of projects are those 
relating to agriculture and rural development and infrastructure and natural 
resources, which can explain 58 percent of the risk variations.  Clearly these two 
sectors represent very effective leverage points in reducing Taliban presence and 
influence.  Considering that the vast majority of Afghans are rural farmers, the 
impact of these sectors is not surprising.  Obviously agriculture and rural 
development is clearly targeting the average Afghan’s livelihood and a further 
analysis of the infrastructure and natural resources category shows in involves 
digging wells, and irrigation improvements, both vitally important to the rural 
farmer.  Projects such as health clinics, schools, good governance, and social 
development, may benefit the population over time, but show no effectiveness in 
reducing the Taliban threat and presumably have no effect on gaining the trust 
and confidence of the Afghan people.  These results indicate that the average 
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Afghan is primarily concerned with his daily subsistence and livelihood and if we 
focus on assisting him in those areas we will have the greatest effect in gaining 
his support and reducing his acceptance and tolerance of the Taliban.  
Additionally, the fact that there was, on average, less than one security 
project per district illustrates the implications at the local level of an under 
resourced reconstruction effort.  It has been said that in a counter-insurgency 
operation security forces only control the ground they stand on, meaning they 
need to maintain a long-term and far reaching presence into the countryside.  
Roaming patrols that come through a town periodically are ineffective, even daily 
patrols cannot get the job done if the Taliban are allowed to maneuver 
unchallenged at night.   
Lastly, this data illustrates the need for patience and a long-term outlook 
when it comes to policy making.  The correlation values between projects and risk 
on the year-to-year basis was weaker than over the entire four year period.  This 
shows that it is the cumulative effect of continued good will, and effective projects 
that can slowly gain the confidence of the Afghan people.  One irrigation project 
will not garner a town’s support overnight; neither will a one or two month 
concentrated “surge” in a particular area.  Success is slow in coming and requires 
a continued presence.  In order to gain the trust and confidence of the people, we 
cannot exercise hit-and-run reconstruction. 
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IV. PROVINCIAL LEVEL ANALYSIS – PART I  
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter takes a slightly different analytical perspective in the treatment 
of reconstruction and risk assessment.  First, in order to address some of the 
potential limitations of analysis at the district level, this chapter focuses on the 
provincial level.  Shifting the unit of analysis to a larger geographical region allows 
for the inclusion of data from the strategic projects database.  Additionally, the 
number of small-scale projects increases dramatically, which may eliminate any 
anomalies at the district level.  Secondly, rather than relying on the UN Risk 
Assessment maps this chapter uses the number of Taliban attacks as the metric 
of Taliban control.  This approach has three key benefits.  First, it offers a second 
source of data to track the trends of Taliban control, which, if it confirms the 
district level analysis, will serve to increase the reliability of those results.  Second, 
using the number of attacks allows for a much more incremental approach to 
measuring Taliban control in contrast to the four levels used in the UN 
Assessment maps.  Lastly, by tracking individual attacks, it is possible to analyze 
relationships and trends between specific targets and specific reconstruction 
projects and ANDS sectors. 
The analysis in this chapter relies on the ACSP combined small-scale and 
PRT project database described in Chapter 3, with the addition of the ACSP 
strategic projects database which is addressed in the methodology section.  
Additionally, the Worldwide Incident Tracking System (WITS) is utilized to gather 
and sort data on Taliban attacks.  Both data sources, reconstruction and attacks, 
provide enough detailed information to compare trends within specific sectors of 
the overall effort, over time, and within the provinces. 
1. Background on ACSP - Strategic Projects Database 
For reasons addressed in Chapter III, the ACSP version VII was selected 
as the database from which reconstruction and stabilization information was 
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gathered.  Because the level of analysis of this chapter is at the provincial level, 
all three elements of the ACSP are utilized: reconstruction data; small-scale 
projects, PRT projects, and strategic projects.  Small-scale and PRT projects, 
essentially track very similar, locally centered projects such as repairing a village 
school or digging wells and local irrigation systems.  Since the actors involved in 
accomplishing the reconstruction is not a concern of this analysis, small-scale 
projects and PRT projects are once again combined into one database for study.  
The strategic projects database, however, tracks major undertakings, such as 
supplying and equipping portions of the Afghan National Army, repairing and 
building power generation and distribution systems, and repairing key lines of 
communication.  In the PRT dataset, 24.5 percent of the projects had zero cost, 
and the average cost of the remaining projects is $82,122.  In the small-scale 
dataset, 20.6 percent of the projects had zero cost and the average cost of the 
remaining projects was only $27,066.  In contrast, the strategic project database 
shows a zero cost for only 12 percent of the projects, with an average project cost 
of $26,386,381 nearly a 100-fold increase over the small-scale project average.  It 
also includes 76 projects valued at over $50,000,000 and one project worth 
$440,000,000.  Clearly projects of this size cannot be compared on an equal 
basis and therefore, because of its unique nature, the strategic projects database 
is treated separately.  
2. Background on WITS  
It is extremely difficult to gather accurate, detailed, and consolidated 
information on the number, location and type of violent incidents in Afghanistan.  It 
is widely assumed the best source of such information is the various intelligence 
functions within ISAF and USCENTCOM, however, such data is classified.  As a 
result of the focus on Iraq, and recent pressure from think-tanks, researchers, and 
regional scholars, the classified incident reports maintain by the United States 
military organizations in Iraq were released with the classified elements removed.  
Similar reports, covering the Afghanistan area remain classified.   
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There are two widely known unclassified sources of information on terrorist 
and violent attack data, the National Counterterrorism Center’s (NCTC) 
Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (WITS) and the Memorial Institute for the 
Prevention of Terrorism’s (MIPT) Terrorism Knowledge Database (TKB).136  The 
methodology of tracking events, as well as, the fidelity of the information with 
each database varies greatly.  For example, in a preliminary search of both 
databases for Taliban related incidents committed within Afghanistan from 1 
January, 2004 to 1 January, 2007, the WITS lists 764 incidents committed by 
“Muslim Extremists – Sunni” while the MIPT lists 336 incidents by the “Taliban.”  
Based on the scope, volume and fidelity of information available, the WITS 
database was utilized as the source for Taliban attack data.  To ensure accuracy 
and increase confidence in the data, this database was cross-referenced to avoid 
duplication and compared to data from the Open Source Center, Afghan News 
Center, BBC monitoring, and the Program for Culture and Conflict Studies, 
located at the Naval Postgraduate School, in Monterey, California.137   
The focus of this study is on the lives of everyday Afghans, the 
reconstruction they see and experience on the ground, and the violence they are 
subjected to.  In light of that focus, elements of the Taliban and ISAF and 
USCENTCOM military-on-military campaigns are not considered.  The key 
indicator of violence is the number of Taliban attacks on the government, security 
forces, and general population.  As a result, using the terrorist incident database 
is appropriate.  Exactly what constitutes a terrorist or a terrorist incident has long 
been debated with no clear consensus.  For the purposes of this study, the 
methodology of the WITS database was acceptable.  The database “consists of 
incidents in which subnational or clandestine groups or individuals deliberately or 
                                                 
136 For the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System see: http://wits.nctc.gov/ (accessed 16 March 
2008) for the Terrorism Knowledge Database see: http://www.tkb.org (accessed 16 March 2008). 
137 For the Open Source Center see https://www.opensource.gov/ (accessed 16 March 2008), 
for the Afghan News Center see http://www.afghanistannewscenter.com/index.html, for BBC 
Monitoring see http://www.monitor.bbc.co.uk/index.shtml (accessed 16 March 2008), for the 
Program for Culture and Conflict Studies see http://www.nps.edu/programs/ccs/index.html 
(accessed 16 March 2008). 
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recklessly attacked civilians or noncombatants (including military personnel and 
assets outside war zones and war-like settings).”138  In order to be listed in the 
database, the attack must have been “initiated and executed,” hoaxes, failed 
attacks and defused attacks are not included.139   
Critical to the analysis was the database’s depth of information relating to 
the attacks.  First, there is a clear delineation between the perpetrators, not in the 
sense of a defined named group as in the Provincial Irish Republican Army, but 
rather the “defining characteristics” such as Christian Extremist.  Second, the 
database lists the number of killed, injured, and hostages for each attack, which 
was used later in the analysis to measure “intensity” of the attacks.  Lastly, the 
database included defining characteristics of the target of the attack such as 
government officials, religious leaders, and population at large.  This 
categorization allowed for the analysis of trends and relationships between 
specific reconstruction sectors and the targets of Taliban attacks.  The database 
also contains information relating to the tactics used in the attacks; however, this 
was not considered relevant to the study and was omitted from the analysis. 
B. METHODOLOGY 
The same methodological procedures relating to the small-scale project 
database and the PRT database were employed in this study as described in 
Chapter III.  That is to say, the databases were combined and the metric used to 
measure the level of effort is the number of projects.  Additionally, only projects 
that are listed as complete or ongoing were included.  Lastly, projects were 
categorized into specific calendar years, whenever possible.  This allows for a 
year-by-year analysis of the trends and relationships.  Projects that could not be 
placed within a specific calendar year, but otherwise contained reliable 
information were still included by under a List Year value of “M.”  These projects 
are included in the aggregated 2004 to 2007 calculations but not the year-to-year 
                                                 




analysis.  M-year projects accounted for only 9.2 percent of the combined total of 
complete or ongoing projects, meaning over 90 percent of the projects were 
accurately placed within a specific year, increasing the confidence level of the 
year-to-year analysis.   
One aspect of the database used to a great degree in this chapter is the 
differentiation between the eight pillars of the Afghanistan National Development 
Strategy (ANDS).  Every one of the over 36,000 reconstruction projects were 
identified with one of the eight pillars, or sectors of development: Security, Good 
Governance, Education, Health, Infrastructure and Natural Resources, Private 
Sector Development, Agriculture and Rural Development, and Social 
Protection.140  A summary of the number of projects by sector is included as Table 
6. 
 
ANDS Sector Number of Projects 
  List Year Grand Total 
  2004 2005 2006 2007 M   
Agriculture & Rural 
Development 1160 1961 1684 567 126 5498
Education 527 1358 1638 867 738 5128
Good Governance 219 407 289 123 301 1339
Health 47 385 511 208 347 1498
Infrastructure & Natural 
Resources 4701 6487 4881 1924 603 18596
Private Sector Development 13 182 33 8 237 473
Security 24 102 247 168 301 842
Social Protection 263 1407 779 258 800 3507
Grand Total 6954 12289 10062 4123 3453 36881
Table 6.   Projects by ANDS sector and Year 
 
The table shows that the peak of the reconstruction effort, in terms of 
number of projects completed, was in 2005.  Despite an increase in funding 
projects were lower in 2006 and are on-pace to decrease even more in 2007.  
The overwhelming concentration of effort in Infrastructure and Natural Resources 
is a positive sign because the analysis in Chapter III showed this sector 
                                                 
140 Afghanistan National Development Strategy – Summary Report, 20. 
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accounted for 58 percent of the decrease in the risk level posed by the Taliban.  
Chapter III would also indicate the effort in Education would be better applied to 
Agriculture and Rural Development which explained over 58 percent of the 
decreased Taliban threat at the district level.  Counting the number of schools 
opened and the number of girls being educated may play well with the American 
public, and provides an easy metric for Congress to measure, but ultimately 
represents western values superimposed on the Afghan countryside.  Just as 
American farmers in the dust bowl era were more concerned with simply feeding 
their kids than worrying if they would get into college, the Afghans are placing 
greater importance on the projects that help them maintain or increase their daily 
existence. 
1. Strategic Projects – Cost of Projects as a Metric 
The ACSP database containing strategic projects is significantly smaller 
than the small-scale and PRT databases.  It contains only 543 projects, nation-
wide, but has an overall value of over $10 billion.  This database was subjected to 
the same quality control procedures used on the small-scale and PRT databases 
and detailed in the previous chapter.  When screening for incomplete, inaccurate 
or otherwise unreliable entries, only 1.1 percent of the entries were eliminated.  In 
keeping with the consistent philosophy that the average Afghan is only effected 
by reconstruction projects that are either completed and being used, or at the very 
minimum, under construction, only strategic projects with a status of complete or 
ongoing were included in the analysis.  This new criteria reduced the dataset to 
266 projects, or 49.5 percent of the total database, valued at over $7 billion, which 
accounted for 66.8 percent of the total database value of over $10 billion.  The 
concept of “List Year” was also used in refining the strategic project database.  
Whenever possible a project was assigned a list year value that corresponded to 
the calendar year in which it was completed.  If a specific completion date could 
not be determined, the project was assigned a list year value through a qualitative 
and quantitative matrix described in Chapter III.  As in earlier analysis, if a project 
data was considered reliable, but a specific date could not be determined then it 
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was assigned a list year value of M.  Unlike the combined small-scale and PRT 
database, where every one of the eight pillars or sectors of development are 
represented, in the strategic projects database, all the projects are categorized as 
either security or infrastructure and therefore represent only two of the eight 
sectors.  
As with the other databases, either the number of projects or the costs of 
projects were presented as possible metrics to measure the level of the 
reconstruction effort.  Unlike the small-scale and PRT databases, where the 
number of projects proved to be the most accurate and useful metric, in the 
strategic project database, the cost of projects was the metric of choice.  The first 
factor in this determination was the issues of project imbalance.  The projects 
included in this database, although almost all were significantly larger than the 
other two databases, they differed dramatically in scope and size.  For example, 
there are 283 projects listed with costs between $1 million and $50 million such as 
regional police centers, counternarcotics equipment and supplies, and secondary 
roads and transmission lines.  But there are also 76 projects listed over $50 
million such as rebuilding sections of major highways, expanding the electrical 
power grid, gas and hydro electric power generation, and army garrisons, and the 
most expensive project was listed at $440 million for the repair and expansion of 
power distribution systems in Kabul and Herat  With such a wide disparity, clearly 
the assumption applied in relation to the other databases, that all projects are 
equal and counted the same cannot be applied to the strategic projects list.  
Additionally, when using the fund allocated to each project as the metric, the 
database proves to be more accurate.  Of the $7,018,777,303 listed for projects 
that were complete or ongoing, 91.6 percent of funds can be attributed to a 
specific calendar year, and only 8.4 percent labeled as “M.”  This high level of 
dating accuracy serves to increase the confidence and relevance of the year-to-
year calculations.  In contrast, when using the number of projects as the metric, 
only 86.5 percent of the complete or going projects can be traced to a specific 
calendar year, decreasing the relevance of year-to-year calculations.  Lastly, of 
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the 266 complete or ongoing projects, only 12 percent are listed with zero cost.  
Admittedly using the cost of projects will result in this 12 percent of the projects 
being ignored, but this is significantly less than the zero cost figures for small-
scale and PRT databases.  It could also be said that the risk, or inherent 
inaccuracies of ignoring 12 percent of the data is less than the inaccuracies of 
equating projects valued at $1 million with projects valued at $440 million.  In 
summary, the reconstruction and stabilization effort captured by the combined 
small-scale and PRT database will continued to be measured by the number of 
projects; however, strategic projects, in order to increase accuracy and relevance, 
will be measured by the cost of projects.   
2. Strategic Projects – Final Dataset 
At the end of this comprehensive database analysis unreliable data was 
eliminated and the remaining entries were categorizing based on List Year and 
project status.  The resultant dataset of dollar values of complete or ongoing 
strategic projects per year for each province in the entire country is shown in 
Table 7.  This represents the dataset utilized in the strategic project analysis in 
this and following chapters. 
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 List Year  
PROVINCE 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 M Grand Total 
Badakhshan       $25,000,000   $25,000,000 $50,000,000 
Badghis    $101,000,000 $55,000,000 $10,000,000  $166,000,000 
Baghlan    $131,000,000   $83,100,000 $214,100,000 
Balkh   $68,400,000 $3,500,000 $87,151,601 $6,000,000  $165,051,601 
Farah    $86,300,000 $1,940,000  $19,200,000 $107,440,000 
Faryab    $101,000,000 $155,000,000 $20,000,000 $4,500,000 $280,500,000 
Ghazni   $26,500,000  $22,484,289 $48,985,450  $97,969,739 
Helmand    $315,705,587 $80,096,533   $395,802,120 
Herat   $189,544,761 $267,300,000 $42,500,000 $40,000,000 $96,000,000 $635,344,761 
Jowzjan    $15,400,000 $80,000,000  $45,990,000 $141,390,000 
Kabol 
(Kabul)   $68,900,000 $184,355,059 $380,453,774 $191,818,881 $65,400,000 $890,927,713 
Kandahar   $218,678,145 $11,146,740 $101,800,000 $195,861,115 $102,000,000 $629,486,000 
Kapisa    $23,000,000    $23,000,000 
Khowst    $77,622,540 $800,000 $20,000,000  $98,422,540 
Konar 
(Kunar)    $45,000,000 $15,362,359   $60,362,359 
Kondoz 
(Kunduz)    $46,264,126 $30,000,000  $22,300,000 $98,564,126 
Laghman $124,000,000  $9,179,388 $38,988,000   $172,167,388 
Lowgar    $6,020,000    $6,020,000 
Multi   $350,000,000 $63,100,000 $216,000,000   $629,100,000 
Nangarhar   $27,600,000 $63,000,000 $54,300,000 $6,000,000  $150,900,000 
Nimruz   $88,750,000     $88,750,000 
Nurestan     $45,237,404   $45,237,404 
Nuristan      $291,000,000  $291,000,000 
Oruzgan 
(Uruzgan)     $34,300,000   $34,300,000 
Paktia   $65,200,000 $10,767,369 $67,725,593   $143,692,962 
Paktika     $124,384,688 $34,580,000  $158,964,688 
Panjshir     $15,000,000 $108,000,000  $123,000,000 
Parvan 
(Parwan)   $73,700,000 $65,600,000 $12,800,000 $99,600,000  $251,700,000 
Takhar      $85,000,000 $25,000,000 $110,000,000 
Vardak    $110,000,000    $110,000,000 
Zabol 
(Zabul)   $147,000,000  $800,000 $63,742,780  $211,542,780 
(blank)   $142,600,000 $111,951,122 $80,000,000  $103,490,000 $438,041,122 
Grand Total $124,000,000 $1,466,872,906 $1,848,211,930 $1,767,124,241 $1,220,588,225 $591,980,000 $7,018,777,303 
        
Table 7.   Final Strategic Project Dataset  
 
By analyzing where and when money was spent, and was not spent, we 
can see some interesting trends.  The largest recipient is, not surprisingly, the 
capital region of Kabul.  The second largest is Herat, on the western border with 
Iran, most of their funding came in 2004-05 when regional leaders held more 
influence over the national government.  Since 2005 their funding has decreased 
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significantly.  Kandahar’s prominence as the number three recipient can likely be 
explained by the large concentration of US forces in that province and the critical 
importance of the Kandahar airfield to US operations.  Also striking is where 
money was not spent.  Tracking the Taliban expansion out of Kandahar, in the 
past two years, they moved primarily into Helmand, Nimroz, Farah and Uruzgan.  
In the 2006 and 2007 timeframe these four provinces received only a combined 
$116.2 million in reconstruction.  This represents only 3.9 percent of the more 
than $2.9 billion spent nation-wide, further supporting the perception held by 
Pashtuns in the south that the central government is not responding to their 
needs.  
3. Processing of WITS Data 
Unlike the reconstruction and stabilization data, where the actual database 
was available for screening and modification, in order to achieve the fidelity and 
accuracy required, the data from WITS had to be accessed through a user-
interface and multiple individual user queries.  The results of these multiple 
inquires, where then combined into a new and separate database, derived from, 
but not maintained by, or found on the WITS website.  It is this new database, 
created specifically for this study that was the core of the attack data used in the 
analysis.   
A preliminary query in the WITS system for attacks within Afghanistan, 
committed by “Islamic Extremist – Sunni” (WITS does not use named groups as 
searchable criteria, but rather the “defining characteristics” of the perpetrators) 
between 1 January 2004 and 30 June 2007 returned roughly 2100 incidents.  
However, it was not possible to categorize the events by province as required for 
the intended analysis.  Instead, separate queries were run for each individual 
province which provided the required fidelity.  Due to spelling anomalies and 
duplications, over fifty different queries were run, the results of which were 
combined into one master database.  Further analysis of the data available on the 
WITS website discovered 87 incidents within Afghanistan where the province was 
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not reported.  The various locations for these incidents was researched, properly 
coded and added to the master database.  Additionally, ten incidents within 
Afghanistan that the WITS database listed as perpetrator unknown were 
researched and verified as likely Taliban attacks, and therefore were added to the 
database.  Lastly, five incidents were removed from the database due to 
unreliable or obviously inaccurate data.   
Using a “List Year” methodology similar to that employed in the 
reconstruction databases, each event was categorized into a specific calendar 
year, to enable year-to-year and time-lag analysis.  Since the reconstruction 
databases are an ISAF led project, all the entries are coded within a specific ISAF 
Regional Command.  The WITS data, however, is run by the National 
Counterterrorism Center and does not use the same methodology.  In order to 
facilitate accurate regional comparisons, every entry was coded with the 
appropriate ISAF Regional Command based on the geographical location of the 
incident.  After countless queries into the WITS system, combining the results, 
screening for errors, omissions and duplications, and extensive modifications, the 
resultant dataset contains 2099 attacks, sorted by target, year, and province, that 
were either definitely or most likely committed by the Taliban.  It was this stand-
alone dataset, specifically developed for this study that formed the basis of the 
attack analysis.  A summary of the events by province and year is included as 
Table 7.  As a reminder, the data for 2007 only lists attacks occurring on or before 
30 June of that year. 
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Attacks per Year by Province 
ISAF Regional Province  
List 
Year   
Grand 
Total 
Command  2004 2005 2006 2007  
Capital kabol 11 28 48 16 103 
Capital Total   11 28 48 16 103 
East Daykondi   2 3   5 
  ghazni 3 22 106 64 195 
  kapisa   1 14 4 19 
  khowst 15 38 79 38 170 
  Kunar 9 18 20 21 68 
  laghman   8 23 17 48 
  lowgar 4 8 18 14 44 
  nangarhar 18 30 40 17 105 
  nuristan 1 8 5 7 21 
  paktia 9 8 36 32 85 
  paktika 2 8 40 24 74 
  parvan 1  3 4 8 
  vardak   10 30 10 50 
East Total   62 161 417 252 892 
North badakhshan 3 3 10 4 20 
  baghlan 1 4 12 4 21 
  balkh 2 10 20 10 42 
  faryab 1 2 7 4 14 
  jowzjan   2 2  4 
  kondoz 3 1 7 8 19 
  samangan   1 2 2 5 
  sar-e pol   1 3 4 8 
  takhar   2 6 1 9 
North Total   10 26 69 37 142 
South helmand 10 68 125 45 248 
  kandahar 24 94 124 66 308 
  uruzgan 8 34 17 17 76 
  zabul 7 51 61 26 145 
South Total   49 247 327 154 777 
West badghis 1 2 8 4 15 
  farah 5 10 37 22 74 
  ghowr    4  4 
  herat 8 13 33 13 67 
  nimruz 1 2 14 8 25 
West Total   15 27 96 47 185 
Grand Total   147 489 957 506 2099 
Table 8.   Final WITS Dataset  
 
As expected, this data closely mirrors the trends in the UN Risk 
Assessment Maps.  The greatest numbers of attacks are in the east, with the 
south a close second.  Additionally, there is a huge increase between 2004 and 
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2005 and again in 2006.  The 2007 figures are on pace to slightly exceed the 
2006 totals, with the east seeing the greatest increase in attacks.  In 2005 it is 
clear the emphasis was in the south which saw a 5-fold increase in attacks.  In 
2006, the south continued to see increased attacks, but with their gains relatively 
secure the Taliban shifted focus to the other three regions, where attacks either 
doubled or tripled. 
Using a “List Year” methodology similar to that employed in the 
reconstruction databases, each event was categorized into a specific calendar 
year, to enable year-to-year and time-lag analysis.  Since the reconstruction 
databases are an ISAF led project, all the entries are coded within a specific ISAF 
Regional Command.  The WITS data, however, is run by the National 
Counterterrorism Center and does not use the same methodology.  In order to 
facilitate accurate regional comparisons, every entry was coded with the 
appropriate ISAF Regional Command based on the geographical location of the 
incident.  After countless queries into the WITS system, combining the results, 
screening for errors, omissions and duplications, and extensive modifications, the 
resultant dataset contains 2099 attacks, sorted by target, year, and province, that 
were either definitely or most likely committed by the Taliban.  It was this stand-
alone dataset, specifically developed for this study that formed the basis of the 
attack analysis.  A summary of the events by province and year is included as 
Table 7.  As a reminder, the data for 2007 only lists attacks occurring on or before 
30 June of that year. 
4. Matching Development Sectors with Targets 
A major goal of this section of the study was to compare trends between 
specific reconstruction sectors and the targeting trend of the Taliban.  Are the 
battle plans of the Taliban influenced by the ongoing reconstruction effort?  In 
other words, if more schools are built in the reconstruction effort, does the Taliban 
respond by attacking more schools?  Every project in the reconstruction data was 
already attributed to one of the eight ANDS sectors, but the attack data was 
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sorted according to twenty four different pre-existing WITS criteria.  In order to 
accurately compare the elements of reconstruction and attacks a common 
method of characterization had to be developed.  First the twenty four different 
victim or target characterization from the WITS database was consolidated into 
five different attack categories developed specifically for this study, according to 
the table below. 
 
Attack Data Categories WITS Victim Categories 




Government   Diplomatic 
Electoral/Polling 
Fire and Rescue 
Government Employee/Contractor 
Government Official 
Non Official Public Figure 
Political Affiliated 
Top Government Officials 







Business   Business 
    Infrastructure 
Population at Large  Civilian 
Refugees/IDPs 
 
Additionally, each of the eight ANDS sectors were matched with a specific 
attack category according to the table below and combined when appropriate.  
When analyzing the data for trends within the attack patterns of the Taliban and 
between reconstruction efforts and Taliban attacks, associations described in the 
table below were used.  As such, a rise in the number of small-scale 
reconstruction projects addressing the ANDS sectors of education or health would 
be compared to a change in attacks targeting “Humanitarian/NGO” which is 
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comprised of educators, students, health care workers, aid workers, NGOs, 
reporters, clergy and religious figures, and humanitarian organizations.  
 
Attack Data Categories Small Scale Projects  Strategic Projects  
Security    Security     Security  
Government    Good Governance     N/A 
Humanitarian / NGO  Education       N/A 
Health 
Business   Infrastructure & Natural Resources  Infrastructure  
Private Sector Development 
Population at Large  Social Protection     N/A 
Agriculture & Rural Development 
 
5. Selection of Provinces   
When determining which provinces to study in greater detail several factors 
were considered.  First, the pool of provinces studied had to be large enough to 
provide a statistically relevant sample.  Each province was going to by analyzed 
on an annual basis from 2004 to 2007, providing 4 individual data point per 
province for every regression calculation.  In order to have a large enough “N” in 
the calculations at least ten provinces had to be studied.  Additionally, there had 
to be a relevant amount of reconstruction data and attack data for each province.  
While every province has experienced some violence and some reconstruction, 
the purpose of this chapter is to analyze the relationship between the two with 
respect to individual sectors, not the aggregated amounts.  In other words, there 
had to be a significant number of attacks to accurately reflect trends in the 
targeting of different sectors; a province with only three attacks cannot be used to 
confidently measure trends and focus areas among the five different target sets.  
In contrast, Kandahar, with 308 attacks, has experienced attacks in every sector 
and in significant volume to overcome the impact of any anomalies in the Taliban 
attack strategy.  As a result, the provinces selected had to have a high level of 
attacks to accurately reflect the Taliban strategy and not simply the actions of 
outlier cells or rouge Taliban commanders.   
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Combining the different factors of selection, every province with 50 or more 
attacks between 1 January 2004 and 30 June 2007 were included in the analysis.  
Only fourteen provinces met this criteria: Farah, Ghazni, Helmand, Herat, Kabol, 
Kandahar, Khowst, Kunar, Nangarhar, Paktia, Paktika, Uruzgan, Vardak, and 
Zabul; there location within Afghanistan is highlighted in Figure 5. 
 
Figure 6.   14 Provinces Studied  
 
6. Limitations and Benefits of Provincial-Level Approach 
There are some inherent limitations and assumptions in this approach 
which must be acknowledged.  First, is that just as with the district level analysis, 
every province is treated as a distinct, uniform entity, there is no account for any 
spill-over effects from the neighboring areas, nor is there any differentiation or 
accounting for variables within a specific province.  Additionally, several factors 
that are clearly relevant have been eliminated from the majority of the analysis, 
such as tribal and ethnic affiliations, Taliban recruiting, financing, and non-violent 
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methodologies, and the effect of ANA, ISAF, and US counter-insurgency and 
counter-terrorist operations, to name a few.  Also, for this study there was no 
distinction between the types of attack.  Arson was considered as an equal to 
suicide bombing and a machine gun attack in the market was considered the 
same as burning an empty government building.  The analysis does not 
distinguish between the tactics used or the impact or the casualties created by the 
attack.  Lastly, by attempting to compare and link reconstruction efforts with 
specific groups of targets a certain level of consolidation was required.  The 
twenty four different victim categories were condensed into five, as where the 
eight ANDS development sectors.  Anytime data is combined or aggregated in 
this manner a certain level of detail is lost. 
This methodology also does not consider variations in Taliban targeting 
due their overall battle plan and existing level of influence with a specific province.  
In other words, if the Taliban did not consider the province strategically important 
to their overall campaign, there may not be as many, or the same type of attacks.  
In some sense this problem is mitigated by the requirement of fifty attacks or more 
to be included in the study, however, even with these criteria, certain provinces 
may be considered of more importance, or the next step in their advancement 
strategy, and thus be subjected to different targeting priorities.  Additionally, once 
a province is firmly in the grips of the Taliban, there is a strong probability that a 
different strategy is employed.  For example, Zabol is one of the longest and 
strongest Taliban strongholds.  In this province, attacks against the population, 
most of whom are Taliban supporters, if not active Taliban members, would be 
counter-productive.  In more closely contested areas, however, where the Taliban 
is attempting to intimidate the villagers not to cooperate with the government and 
international organizations, attacks against the population and aid workers is 
more common.  Kandahar serves as an example of this shifting strategy, where 
despite a large security effort and large numbers of reconstruction projects, the 
attack data shows far less attacks against the security forces, or the projects, but 
a much greater emphasis on attacks against the general population.  This may 
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indicate a problem with controlling the population and the corresponding Taliban 
response, regardless of the reconstruction efforts. 
C. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS  
After retrieving extensive data from both the ACSP and WITS databases 
and then performing custom modifications and improvements, the result is a 
dataset that lists each of the fourteen provinces under study, with the number of 
attacks and reconstruction projects by year that were associated with one of five 
different categories developed for this project; Security, Government, 
Humanitarian/NGO, Business, or Population at large. A full copy of the dataset is 
included as Appendix C. 
From this dataset, regression calculations were performed to determine the 
relationships between specific reconstruction sectors and the targeting trends of 
the Taliban across the fourteen provinces on a year-to-year basis between 2004 
and 2007.  A summary of the findings are listed in Table 9. 
 

















$ Strategic security 0.020 0.005 0.038 0.009 0.006 0.000 0.076 
$ Strategic Infrastructure 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.014 0.007 0.014 0.001 
$ Strategic Total 0.017 0.011 0.020 0.020 0.011 0.005 0.028 
        
Security projects 0.314 0.408 0.204 0.036 0.133 0.022 0.323 
Government Projects 0.168 0.140 0.166 0.072 0.157 0.035 0.175 
Humanitarian / NGO 
Projects 0.033 0.015 0.047 0.051 0.067 0.004 0.022 
Business Projects 0.000 0.020 0.008 0.007 0.062 0.002 0.000 
Population at Large 
Projects 0.040 0.020 0.057 0.020 0.062 0.017 0.049 
        
Table 9.   Results of Project Sectors and Taliban Targets 
 
Additionally, the calculations involving security projects resulted in a 
Multiple R value of .561 significant at .001 when correlated with total attacks, and 
when correlated with security attacks resulted in a Multiple R value of .639, also 
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significant at .001.  With respect to population attacks, the Multiple R value 
was .569 significant at .001.  In other words, the increase in security projects can 
explain an amazing 56 to 64 percent of the increase in attacks, with less than a 1 
in 1,000 chance of pure coincidence.   
Some very interesting observations can be drawn from these results.  First, 
the strategic level reconstruction efforts, both in the security sector and the 
infrastructure had essentially zero impact on both the overall level of violence in 
the provinces and the number of attacks directed at specific sectors.  For the 
fourteen provinces in the study, the strategic effort was valued at over $3.7 billion, 
which accounts for over half of the completed or ongoing projects nationwide.  Of 
the total amount, nearly $1.4 billion was spent on security.  While these results 
cannot support the dramatic claim that the money was wasted, it does statistically 
speaking, show there is no relationship, positive or negative between the amount 
of money spent on security and the number of attacks as a whole, or within 
specific target groups.   
When comparing the impact of specific reconstruction efforts with the 
corresponding sets of targets, with the exception of security projects, there was 
also no relationship.  The level of government projects in no way related to the 
number of attacks against government targets, the same can be said for 
Humanitarian/NGO projects, business projects, and population at large projects.  
This analysis was intended to test the notion that as soon as a school, or market, 
or government outpost is built, the Taliban destroys it.  If the Taliban targeted their 
attacks primarily on recently completed projects, then there would be a strong 
correlation between reconstruction efforts and Taliban attacks within the same 
category, and this proved not to be the case.   
A significant example of the limited impact of specific reconstruction 
sectors is the money spent on strategic infrastructure improvements, over $2.3 
billion for the fourteen provinces.  The level of effort in this sector of the 
reconstruction program had no impact on the number of attacks or the targets.  
That is to say that the projects themselves were not targeted, and the general 
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population was not targeted (no correlation with population attacks) as 
punishment for cooperating with the government.  The causation for this 
relationship, or lack thereof is debatable.  Perhaps the projects are of such high 
value and significance that they were heavily defended against attack.  Perhaps, 
as in the case of the “Ring Road” the benefit of ease of travel not only benefits the 
government and business communities, but is also seen as an advantage to the 
Taliban, and therefore is not contested. 
The strongest relationship, by far, between any sectors of the 
reconstruction effort and Taliban attacks is the positive correlation between 
security projects and security attacks.  This regression analysis produced an R-
squared value of 0.408 and Multiple R value of .639.  A scatter plot of the data 


















Figure 7.   Small-Scale Security Projects vs. Security Attacks 
 
The figure illustrates and the calculations confirm that the number of 
attacks is closely tied to the number of projects, in fact the increase in the number 
of projects accounts for almost 64 percent of the increase in attacks.  This data 
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does not support any conclusions regarding causation, however.  It cannot 
quantitatively be determined if an increase in security projects provoked an 
increase in Taliban attacks against security targets, or if security projects were 
increased in response to a high level of Taliban security attacks.   
In an effort to determine which aspect was increasing first, and therefore 
increasing the case for causation, a time lag analysis on this dataset was applied.  
Because the data is categorized on an annual basis, a twelve month time lag 
interval was the smallest possible.  When a time lag was applied to the security 
projects, in other words 2005 security project data was compare to 2004 attack 
data, the R-squared value dropped to 0.159, illustrating that projects were not 
undertaken in response to Taliban attacks.  When similar methodology was 
applied to attack data (2005 attack data compared to 2004 security project data), 
the R-squared value dropped to 0.029, showing essentially no correlation 
between the amount of Taliban attacks that targeted security forces and the 
number of security projects undertaken in the previous year.  To summarize, the 
time lag interval of twelve months produced significantly weaker relationships.  
This however, does not rule out the likely scenario that either the attacks or the 
number of projects increases first and the other follows, but simply illustrates that 
the planning cycle for either the Taliban or the reconstruction effort is less than 
twelve months.   
In sum, the quantitative analysis proves an increase in security projects 
accounted for 56 to 64 percent of the increase in total attacks, attacks on security 
targets and attacks against the population.  Additionally, the increase in security 
projects and attacks occurred the in the same twelve month period.  Deductively 
we can analyze three possible causation relationships.  First, is that the increases 
are purely coincidental.  This is possible, but the calculations illustrate the 
likelihood of a coincidental relationship of this type as less than 1 in 1,000.  
Second, is that the increase in attacks occurred first and the reconstruction 
community responded with an increase in completed security projects within the 
same twelve month window.  This is possible, but not plausible given the timeline 
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and bureaucratic process required to identify, plan, approve, fund and build 
reconstruction projects.  The third possible explanation is that the security projects 
were completed first and then there was a rise in attacks.  This would imply that 
either the reconstruction community correctly predicted future Taliban offensives 
and purposefully increased the security presence in those areas, or more likely, 
the Taliban saw what they perceived as the central government and ISAF forces 
challenging their authority and responded with an increase in attacks.  The end 
result is that the increase in security projects at the very least precedes, and 
possibly causes the increase in total attacks, population attacks and security 
attacks. 
Clearly the traditional approach to eliminating a conventional force by 
increase security presence and security operations is not working against the 
Taliban.  At the strategic level the $2.3 billion spent on security and infrastructure 
had zero impact on decreasing Taliban operations.  The security effort at the local 
or small-scale level did not decrease attacks, but actually accounted for over 54 
percent of the increase in attacks.  This would appear counter-intuitive if 
considering actions against a conventional opponent; however, it fits the model 
when considering the Taliban as an insurgency.  Very few counter-insurgency 
operations are won kinetically, in other words, by attempting to kill all the 
insurgents.  In fact, most direct military action targeting insurgents can actually 
increase their strength.  It is usually much more effective to address the needs of 
the population or support them directly, thereby winning their allegiance and 
eliminating the recruitment and support base for the insurgents.   
The applicability of the counter-insurgency model in Afghanistan is further 
supported by the results in Chapter III.  At the District level projects aimed at 
addressing the immediate needs of the Afghans, namely assistance in farming 
and rural livelihoods had the greatest impact on gaining the support of the people 
and reducing their support for, and the threat from, the Taliban.  This is a classic 
example of draining the proverbial sea in which insurgents operate. 
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Why the district level results on the effectiveness of agriculture and rural 
development and natural resources were not duplicated at the provincial level is 
unclear.  One possible explanation is with the selection of provinces.  Because 
each province had to meet the 50 attack criteria, it could be argued that these 
provinces are key to the Taliban strategy, hence the high number of attacks.  If 
the Taliban did see these areas as strategically important, it is likely they would 
continue operations there even without the support of the local residents, 
importing supplies and manpower if necessary in order to oppose the government 
presence.  Under such conditions, no amount of aid in the short term would 
decrease the level of Taliban attacks. 
In conclusion, the results of this chapter and Chapter III show that projects 
focusing on security at the local level is actually increasing attacks, while projects 
focusing on rural farming and irrigation are decreasing risk levels, and strategic-
level security projects are having no effect on the Taliban.  This evidence 
supports the perspective that the battle in Afghanistan is not an extended mop-up 
operation that should target Taliban forces in the field, but rather a classic 
counter-insurgency struggle, where the best chance for success lies with the trust 
and confidence of the people. 
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V. PROVINCIAL LEVEL ANALYSIS – PART II 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter presents the last round of statistical analysis conduct for this 
study.  It attempts to provide further insight into trends already discovered, 
reinforce previous trends through the use of alternative data sources, and 
compensate for, and mitigate some of the inherent limitations of the previous 
methodologies.   
1. Previous Analysis and Results  
The analysis in Chapter III was focused at the district level and compared 
the impact of small-scale reconstruction projects, both in overall numbers and 
individual development sectors, on the level of Taliban risk as assessed by the 
United Nations Department of Safety and Security on a year-to-year basis 
between 2004 and 2007.  One significant finding from this analysis was that as 
the overall number of projects and especially those focused on agriculture and 
rural development and infrastructure development increased, the risk assessment 
level decreased.  Additionally, the number of security projects within a specific 
district proved to have no effect on the risk assessment levels. 
Chapter IV presented analyses conducted on a larger geographical area 
and utilized a different set of data in an effort to either confirm or refute the district 
level findings.  Fourteen different provinces were selected as the unit of analysis, 
which allowed for the inclusion of the strategic project database valued at over 
$3.7 billion in ongoing or completed projects within the fourteen provinces.  
Instead of relying on the UN assessments, data on the number, location, type, 
and targets of Taliban attacks were used.  Analysis was conducted comparing the 
impact of each of the eight sectors of the reconstruction plan on the overall 
number of Taliban attacks, and the targeting trends of the Taliban, on a year-to-
year basis.  The results showed that an increase in the number of small-scale 
security projects had a strong correlation to an increase in overall attacks and 
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attacks focused on both security forces and the general population within each 
district.  The conclusions of the district level analysis, that increases in 
infrastructure, agriculture and rural development corresponded to a decrease 
Taliban threat, could not be confirmed at the provincial level.  Additionally, the 
$3.7 billion spent on complete or ongoing strategic security and strategic 
infrastructure projects in the provinces had zero effect on the number or targets of 
Taliban attacks.  
2. Focus of Chapter V 
This chapter also uses the province as the unit of analysis, but it is the first 
to include every province in the nation.  It compares the reconstruction effort, both 
strategic and small-scale to Taliban attack patterns and intensity in every province 
in the country.  This approach was specifically designed to counter some of the 
methodological limitations addressed in previous chapters.  First, by using 
provinces as the level of analysis, the data from the strategic project database 
can be utilized.  Using every province in the study results in the largest pool of 
reconstruction data and attack data, limiting the corrupting effect of outlier attacks.  
Additionally, by analyzing the entire country, provinces where the Taliban are 
historically strong, or call their “heartland” are combined with provinces where 
they are historically and currently weak.  Likewise, it will include provinces that 
represent the next phase of the Taliban battle plan and therefore receive an 
inordinate number of attacks, with perhaps a different targeting strategy; and it will 
also include provinces that are not, or were not key elements of the Taliban 
strategy from 2004 to 2007.  This approach should address any possible skewing 
of the data by focusing on specific provinces.   
By measuring every province there are enough individual data points to 
conduct a variation on the previous analysis.  All the analysis in Chapters III and 
IV were conducted on a year-to-year basis, providing four data points per 
province or district for every different calculation.  Using all the provinces creates 
a large enough pool to measure trends on an aggregated level from 2004 to 2007 
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between provinces.  In other words the total number of attacks and reconstruction 
projects within a specific sector between 2004 and 2007 can be combined for 
each individual province and compared between provinces.  This four year 
aggregation can overcome for anomalies or outside factors influencing either the 
reconstruction data or attacks trends for a specific year.  In addition, the larger 
pool of data enables a more detailed analysis of the impact of strategic projects 
by studying only those provinces that were the direct beneficiaries of the projects.  
This chapter also attempts to compensate for the previous assumption that all 
attacks were equal, both in their impact and their multiple costs to the Taliban.  By 
introducing a measurement of “intensity” larger attacks are given a larger value to 
emphasize their greater effect.   
By altering some of the previous methods and scope, and introducing new 
analytical techniques this chapter attempts to answer several questions: 
Will the dollars spent on strategic security projects and strategic 
infrastructure projects continue to show no correlation to the level of Taliban 
attacks?   
Will security projects continue to have a positive correlation with the 
number of attacks?   
Will infrastructure, rural and agricultural development have an inverse 
relationship with attacks on the national level as they did at the district level?   
Will the introduction of attack “intensity” produce any new relationships, or 
strengthen the ones previously discovered?   
Lastly, will comparison between the four year aggregated values for each 
province hold any new insights? 
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B. METHODOLOGY 
1. Selection Area 
This chapter analyzes the reconstruction and attack levels for the entire 
country, using the province as the unit of analysis.  As such, all thirty four 
provinces are included in the study and are treated with equal weight in all 
analysis. 
2. Reconstruction Databases and Modifications 
As with previous chapters the reconstruction data used for the study comes 
from the ACSP version VII.  The small-scale project database and PRT project 
database were combined, modified, and screened as described in Chapter III.  
The number of projects is used as the metric to measure the level of the small-
scale reconstruction effort within specific provinces.  The strategic project data 
was extensively modified and screened as described in Chapter IV.  For this 
chapter the cost of projects continues to be the most accurate metric to measure 
the strategic reconstruction effort, as explained in previous chapters.  This chapter 
is the first time the databases are used in their entirety.  For the combined small-
scale and PRT project database, this represents 44,601 projects (valued at $3.6 
billion) and for the strategic database, this includes 537 projects valued at over 
$10.5 billion.  In both the combined database of small-scale projects and strategic 
level projects, only ongoing or completed projects will be utilized for the study, 
which equates to 36,935 small-scale projects and nearly $6.9 billion worth of 
strategic projects.  Lastly, because the focus is on overall attack numbers and 
intensity, not the specific targeting trends, there was no requirement to condense 
the reconstruction data into the previously use five categories.  Instead 
reconstruction data will be analyzed according to the eight different sectors of 
development as outlined in the ANDS and utilized in Chapter III. 
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3. Processing of WITS Data 
Data on the number, location, and timing of Taliban attacks were gathered 
from the WITS database, and modified, screened, and edited as described in 
Chapter IV.  The significant change in this analysis is the use of an “intensity” 
scale.  One potential downfall of the methodology described thus far is the 
assumption that all attacks are the same.  Just as using the number of projects as 
the metric to measure reconstruction efforts mandates that every project be 
considered equal in scope and impact, simply counting the number of Taliban 
attacks assumes they all have the same impact and represent the same level of 
training, planning, cost, and logistical effort to the Taliban.  To help minimize this 
oversimplification, a measure of intensity was developed and applied to each of 
the 2099 attacks in the dataset.  The “intensity” level is simply the combined 
number of victims – either dead, injured, or held hostage.  Attacks that resulted in 
a higher number of casualties have a higher intensity level, and attacks where a 
large number of hostages were captured have a high intensity level.  This helps 
differentiate between a car bomb in the market square that kills scores of people 
and an attack on an empty government building.  The intensity levels for each 
attack were averaged over the calendar year for each province.  As a result, this 
analysis uses a total number of attacks and average intensity for each province 
per year for each year between 2004 and 2007. 
C. PRESENTATION OF RESULTS 
1. Initial Reconstruction Analysis 
When the final modifications of the combined small-scale and PRT 
database, the Strategic Projects database, and the WITS data results are 
combined the result is a single dataset that for every province in the country lists 
by year, the overall number of projects, the number of projects for each of the 
eight ANDS sectors, the total value of strategic projects, and individual values for 
strategic security projects and strategic infrastructure projects, and list the number 
of Taliban attacks and their average intensity.  Additionally, the same data is 
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presented by each province in an aggregated form combining the data from 2004 
to 2007.  This final dataset provided the basis for the statistical analysis describe 
below.  A copy of this complete dataset is included as Appendix D.   
The first series of calculations were intended to test the previous results 
that security projects were positively correlated with overall attacks, and that the 
overall number of projects, and especially agriculture and infrastructure projects 
were negatively correlated with the level of risk posed by the Taliban.  A summary 
of the initial regression tests and the resultant R-squared values are listed in 
Table 9. 
 
  R-squared values 
  Attacks  Intensity 
Total projects  0.066  0.000
    
security projects  0.363  0.042
social projects  0.000  0.004
Privatization projects  0.020  0.006
Infrastructure projects  0.008  0.000
health projects  0.053  0.000
Good governance 
projects  0.200  0.002
education projects  0.009  0.000
agriculture projects  0.140  0.002
    
Security $  0.080  0.045
Infrastructure $  0.014  0.009
Total $  0.065  0.038
Table 10.   Results of Project, Attack, and Intensity Analysis141  
 
The results primarily reinforce earlier trends noted at the provincial level, 
and further discredit results from the district level analysis.  The strongest 
relationship is the positive correlation between security projects and the overall 
level of attacks.  The district level finding that total projects, agriculture projects, 
and infrastructure projects were all negatively correlated with overall level of 
Taliban risk is not supported by these results.   
                                                 
141 The analysis of Security Projects and Attacks also produced a Multiple R value of .603 
significant at the .001 level. 
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The inclusion of an “intensity” factor failed to uncover any correlation 
between the scale of the attacks and the reconstruction effort.  One possible 
explanation for the statistical independence of the Intensity level with respect to 
this analysis is that the intensity level is determined primarily by the Taliban 
strategic battle plan.  That is to say, those provinces that make-up the next phase 
of Taliban expansion garner the majority of the Taliban resources in men and 
materials and technical expertise, and therefore experience the most intense 
attacks.  Based on this premise, unless the international community is correctly 
predicting the Taliban’s future operations and purposefully emphasizing 
reconstruction efforts in the same areas, there would be no direct correlation 
between reconstruction and intensity.   
Another significant “non-relationship” is the continued lack of impact the 
strategic security sector and strategic infrastructure sector have on the overall 
number of attacks.  This result, which was also seen in the earlier provincial 
analysis that focused on the fourteen provinces where the Taliban was the most 
active, apparently holds true nation-wide.   
2. Refinement of Strategic Reconstruction Analysis 
As discussed in the methodology section, the larger data pool of all thirty 
four provinces allowed for variations in the statistical analysis.  One nuanced 
approached applied to the calculations involving the strategic project data.  
Previous calculations in earlier chapters and the results described thus far in this 
chapter measured the level of strategic projects in every province within the study, 
regardless of whether there were actual strategic projects located within the 
provinces.  In other words, there were numerous provinces included in the 
analysis where the value of strategic projects was zero.  The larger data pool 
allows for an analysis of only those provinces that experienced some level of 
strategic-level reconstruction.   
In certain contexts the inclusion of cases where the value of one variable, 
like strategic projects, is zero is essential, and the removal of these cases could 
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be construed as corrupting the data.  However, when measuring the impact of 
strategic reconstruction, this refinement of the data may actually produce more 
relevant results.  First, if we consider the true goal of the analysis, measuring the 
impact of strategic dollars spent, including cases where zero dollars were spent 
hardly seems relevant.  The case for excluding provinces with no strategic 
projects is strengthened when considering the external factors.  It could be argued 
that provinces that have not received any strategic reconstruction are in either 
one of two categories.  The first are those provinces that are so strongly 
controlled by the Taliban that the treat of attack and project security is so great 
that a conscious decision was made to bypass that province.  The second likely 
scenario are provinces that are relatively well-off and rank lower in the national 
priorities than those provinces in dire need.  Such provinces are likely to have a 
much more limited Taliban presence.  Based on this premise, provinces that did 
not receive any strategic reconstruction funds are just as likely to be strong 
Taliban strongholds and subject to frequent attacks, as they are to be relatively 
free of Taliban, and relatively free of Taliban attacks.  As a result, a zero value for 
strategic aid can be linked to both extremes of the attack level spectrum, and will 
likely skew the data, or at a minimum cover any trends.  In order to more 
accurately measure the impact of strategic reconstruction effort, a second series 
of calculations were performed, this time only including the provinces that had 
experienced some level of strategic aid.  A summary of the analytical results are 
presented in Table 11. 
 
 R-Squared values 
  Attacks  Intensity 
Security $  0.048  0.015 
Infrastructure $  0.001  0.050 
Security $ + 
Infrastructure $  0.005  0.002 
Table 11.   Results of Refined Strategic Reconstruction Analysis 
 
The results above clearly show that when considering only those provinces 
that received some level of strategic reconstruction, either security or 
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infrastructure, there is no relationship between the amount of dollars spent and 
the level of attacks on a year-to-year basis.  Additionally, there was no 
relationship between the dollars spent and the level of intensity of the attacks.  
Rather than contradicting the previous nation-wide results as expected, these 
results reinforce the conclusion that the strategic effort, worth over $6.9 billion, 
has no correlation with the level or intensity of Taliban attacks.  
There are at least two possible explanations for this result.  First is that the 
majority of these programs are targeting long-range development goals.  The 
refurbishment of the power generator in a dam is going to have little effect on the 
average Afghan including those that live within the same district.  Repairing the 
generator is just one small part of the overall electrical power grid development 
plan, which requires new high-capacity power lines, substations, local power lines, 
and finally, electrically run motors and equipment before the impact of the 
repaired generator is felt in the rural village.  The same scenario can be made for 
the majority of the infrastructure projects; they are in a sense, setting the stage for 
future development and growth but have little immediate impact.   
One explanation for the seemingly ineffective strategic security projects lies 
in the counter-factual; there may not be a decrease in areas with security projects, 
but it is difficult to say if attacks would have risen, and if so, by how much, if there 
was no money spent on security projects.  In a sense strategic security projects 
may not be reducing attacks, but may be limiting their expansion.  There are 
several examples where a dramatic decrease in security funding resulted in a 
large increase in attacks.142  It is unclear, and impossible to know for certain, if 
these attacks would have increase regardless of security spending, but in the four 
cases described, the largest increase in attacks over the four year period 
occurred in the same year security funding was cut.   
                                                 
142 Comparing the data in Appendix C provides the following examples: Kandahar (2004–
2005) funding dropped from $66.7 million to $5.6 million; attacks rose 390% (24 to 94) Zabul 
(2004-2005) funding dropped from $64.2 million to $0; attacks rose 728% (7 to 51) Helmand 
(2005-2006) funding dropped from $135.7 million to $5.9 million; attacks rose 183% (68 to 125) 
Khowst (2005-2006) funding dropped from $77.6 million to $0.8 million; attacks rose 207% (38 to 
79). 
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3. Aggregation Analysis 
In another attempt to maximize the benefits of the larger data pool and 
provide alternative approaches to either strengthen or refute previous findings, a 
series of analysis was conducted on an aggregated set of data.  For each 
province the year-to-year data between 2004 and 2007 for overall number of 
projects, projects in each specific ANDS sector, overall strategic funding, strategic 
funding by sector, overall number of attacks, and average attack intensity, were 
combined into single values for each category encompassing the entire four year 
period.  This methodology shifts the points of analysis from year-to-year within 
specific provinces, to the overall four year period between provinces.  Additionally, 
using the aggregated data for the four years, should minimize the effects of 
unknown anomalies or outside factors that may have placed significant influence 
on particular provinces during specific years, in both the reconstruction effort and 
the Taliban attack strategy.  This has the effect of reducing the number of data 
points for every analysis from four per province to only one.  Naturally this 
reduces the total observations, or N for each calculation, which is why the 
aggregation analysis was only performed on the national level, with all thirty four 
provinces under study.  A summary of the calculations are included as Table 12. 
 
Aggregated 2004-2007 total values 
  R Squared values 
  Attacks  Intensity 
Total Projects  0.256  0.031 
Security projects  0.585  0.076 
     
Security $  0.157  0.095 
Infrastructure $  0.130  0.052 
Security $ + 
Infrastructure $  0.217  0.109 
Table 12.   Results of Aggregated Analysis  
 
Additional analysis revealed that security projects and attacks had a 
Multiple R value of .765 significant at .001 level while total projects and attacks 
had a multiple R value of .500 and a significant at .003.  In other words, over the 
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four year period the increase in security projects can account for an incredible 76 
percent of the increase in the number of attacks, with a less than 1 in 1,000 
chance the results were coincidental. 
This analysis revealed several interesting results.  Most notably, the 
positive correlation between the number of security projects and the number of 
Taliban attacks proved to be even stronger when assessed over the entire four 
year period than it was on a year to year basis.  A scatter plot of these data points 
are included as Figure 8, to further illustrate the strength of the relationship.  
 
Attacks vs Security Projects 

















Figure 8.   Aggregated Security Projects vs Total Attacks 
 
As the figure illustrates and the data confirms, the relationship between the 
number of security projects and the number of attacks is very strong.  Considering 
all the possible influences on Taliban attacks (resources, funding, recruitment, 
ISAF actions, tribal struggles, regional warlords, etc.) for any one factor to have a 
significant relationship is surprising.  The fact that an increase in security projects 
accounted for more than 76 percent of the increase in attacks is amazing.  One 
might expect recruitment or funding to have such a close relationship to attacks, 
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but for an external measure, and one designed to decrease attacks, to have such 
a strong relationship to increasing attacks is very surprising.   
These results further emphasize the conclusions of Chapter IV that the 
struggle against the Taliban is a counter-insurgency operation where attempts to 
kill the Taliban and establish “strategic hamlets” or safe areas by high levels of 
security only bring more attacks and increased Taliban presence.  Rather than 
trying to kill the Taliban, our strategy should be to gain the trust and confidence of 
the people, eliminating the base of support for the Taliban.   
Unfortunately, the relationship at the district level between increasing 
agriculture and rural development and decreasing risk levels was not duplicated 
at the national level.  Some possible explanations for this were discussed in 
Chapter IV, namely the selection of provinces were of such strategic importance 
to the Taliban that they would fight there with, or without, public support.  The 
nation-wide analysis was intended to overcome this shortcoming; however, the 
results were also inconclusive.   
The aggregated data also refutes the earlier findings that the overall 
number of projects had a negative correlation with the level of the Taliban threat.  
This data illustrates there is a significant positive correlation over the four year 
period between Taliban attacks and the number of projects.  Additionally, the 
strategic reconstruction effort, both as a whole and its individual parts continue to 
show little-to-no impact on the level of Taliban attacks.  With respect to the level 
of intensity of the attacks, no element of the reconstruction effort, neither small-
scale projects of any type, nor strategic reconstruction efforts, showed any 
significant impact. 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter employed slightly different analytical approaches in an effort 
to either refute or strengthen prior findings and address some of the potential 
shortcomings inherent in the more detailed analysis of previous chapters.  The 
unit of analysis was the provincial level, but for the first time, data from the entire 
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country was used.  Attack data was refined to include a measure of intensity for 
each attack in the analysis.  Additionally, analysis was performed on the 
aggregated data from 2004 to 2007 for each province and compared between 
provinces.  
This varied approach proved successful in addressing some of the 
questions proposed at the beginning of the chapter.  Despite including the entire 
country, and running analysis only on provinces that received strategic 
reconstruction projects, the $6.9 billion effort continued to show no measurable 
effect on the level of Taliban attacks.  The number of security projects continued 
to have a positive correlation with the number of attacks.  This proved true on the 
national level and the correlation was especially strong when studied over a four 
year aggregation period.  The results of the district analysis could, once again, not 
be replicated at the national level.  Unlike the district analysis, projects dedicated 
to infrastructure and rural and agriculture development had no significant impact 
on the level of Taliban attacks.  Furthermore, the total number of projects, which 
had a negative correlation with attacks at the district level, showed a positive 
correlation at the national level, when data was study over the four year period.  
Unfortunately, the attempt to overcome the limitation of considering all attacks as 
equal by introducing an intensity factor produced no significant relationships or 
new trends.  Likewise, with the exception of security projects and the total number 
of projects, the aggregation methodology produced no new insights. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS 
It is safe to say that in the world after 11 September 2001 failed and failing 
states have taken on greater importance.  Because there is a risk these states will 
become safe heavens for terrorists, or actually run by terrorists or their proxies, 
the disposition of failed states, failing states and states on the verge of recovery 
have become high-priority national security items.  For these reasons, 
Afghanistan remains a critical national security issue for the United States, and 
why we continue to focus our attention there.  A review of the reporting and 
analysis on Afghanistan and the United States’ effort there very quickly focuses 
on several factors; the country is still important, progress has stalled and in some 
cases regressed, the Taliban are making resurgence, and our initial strategy to 
accomplish nation building with limited manpower and money is failing.  What is 
not very well addressed is the root cause of the regression; was the 
reconstruction strategy correct but poorly resourced and therefore doomed to fail 
from the start, or was the reconstruction strategy misguided to begin with?  As 
there is no shortage of opinions on the proper strategy for post-conflict 
reconstruction, the question is not merely academic.  If the wrong strategy was 
implemented, it would have failed regardless of the amount of resources, the fact 
that resources were limited was merely a coincidence.  We cannot assume that 
simply adding more men and materials will produce a successful outcome if the 
strategy itself was flawed.  This study attempted to answer some of these 
questions by analyzing an admittedly very small piece of the overall post-conflict 
reconstruction effort through a quantitative method.   
A. THEORY AND REALITY 
After first clarifying some overly used terms, a review of various post-
conflict reconstruction strategies were presented.  It quickly became clear that 
despite studying the concepts for over ten years, there were no clear schools of 
thought or ideological dividing lines.  This was not simply import-substitution 
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supporters countering “Washington Consensus” proponents, the ideas ran the 
complete spectrum from post-conflict reconstruction was a waste of time to we 
should make governments just “good enough” to full-blown social engineering to 
make the society “better” than it was before.  Likewise, the implementation and 
policy recommendations were also very diverse.  Of those experts that did agree 
that post-conflict reconstruction was at least worth trying, one of the few points of 
agreement was that a holistic approach is required, and security must come first.   
With all of the disagreement within the epistemic communities, the 
international community and the United States cannot be completely to blame for 
a thus-far floundering recovery effort in Afghanistan because as a whole there is 
no clear road-map or success story on how to restore a war-ravaged third-world 
country into a functioning democracy.  With that acknowledged, the choices that 
were made must be acknowledged and judged on their own merit.  For example, 
a new domestic government was put in charge of the state from the very 
beginning, rather than an interim international body; the democratic process was 
started at the national level with no structures in place at the sub-levels of 
governance; the overwhelming majority of aid and funding was funneled outside 
of the new governments control; and finally, the linchpin of security – a Disarm 
Demobilize Reintegrate (DDR) program was never truly implemented, in fact the 
warlords were empowered and task with maintaining security in the countryside.  
Additionally, the United States military, international governments, and 
international civilian aid agencies all followed a minimalist approach.  No one 
single organization had the mandate or the resources to oversee, manage and 
coordinate the post-conflict reconstruction effort and as a result it became a very 
ad-hoc, inefficient and ineffective campaign.   
However, some progress has been made.  Not only is there a political 
system in place, but roads, schools, water wells, health clinics, power grids, 
irrigation systems and countless other projects have been completed.  Since there 
was no overarching strategy relating to most of these projects, they to were 
mostly an ad-hoc endeavor.  What was the effectiveness of these projects, what 
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impact do they have on reducing the level of violence, and thereby increasing the 
quality of life (in some respects) of the average Afghan?  The analysis that was 
presented attempted to fill that gap of knowledge by quantitatively measuring the 
level of reconstruction within specific sectors and overall, and comparing those 
results with various measurements of Taliban control and violence. 
B. QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
Chapter III presented analysis focused at the district level, measuring 
various factors within twenty two different districts, nation-wide.  The work utilized 
the UN Risk Assessment maps to measure the level of Taliban control on a scale 
from one to four.  Additionally, the modified ACSP small-scale projects and PRT 
projects database was used to measure the level of reconstruction efforts within 
each district.  The reconstruction effort was further divided in the analysis by 
specific sectors of the overall ANDS plan.   
The major finding of this analysis was that, at the district level there was a 
significant negative correlation between the total number of projects and the level 
of risk.  That is to say the more projects undertaken in a specific district, the lower 
the risk assessment tended to be.  Specifically projects in the agriculture and rural 
development sector and infrastructure development sector had the greatest 
impact in lowering the risk level.  Additionally, at the district level, the number of 
security projects had neither a positive or negative relation to the level of risk, 
making them statistically irrelevant. 
With the intent to verify and confirm the trends discovered at the district 
level with an alternate approach and different sources of information, Chapter IV 
changed both the level of analysis and the type of data studied.  Chapter IV 
changed the level of analysis from the district level to the provincial level, 
selecting a statistically significant group of fourteen provinces.  Altering the level 
of analysis allowed for a new series of reconstruction data to be employed in the 
analysis, namely the strategic project database, representing over $10 billion 
worth of projects, nation-wide.  The combined small-scale projects and PRT 
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projects were also used, but aggregated into provincial level data.  In addition to 
varying the level of analysis and the reconstruction data used, a new criteria was 
used to measure the level of Taliban control and influence in the provinces.  
Through a series of modifications and quality control measures, data from the 
WITS database was used to track the number, location, timing, and targeting of 
individual Taliban attacks nation-wide.  The reconstruction and attack data was 
sorted and categorized into five different sectors to facilitate for side-by-side 
comparisons on a year-to-year basis.   
The results of these comparisons produced significant results both in the 
relationships that were discovered, and the lack of relationships in certain sectors.  
First, the inclusion of strategic projects dedicated to either infrastructure 
development or security, utilized for the first time due to the larger unit of analysis, 
had remarkably little effect on the data.  In the fourteen provinces covered in this 
section, the strategic projects described as current or ongoing, represented $3.7 
billion on international investment, which is over half of all complete or ongoing 
projects currently funded.  Despite the high level of investment, these projects, 
statistically speaking, zero impact on the number of attacks or the targets of those 
attacks.  The second significant non-relationship discover by this analysis was, 
with the exception of security projects, the interaction between specific 
development sectors and the targeting trend of the Taliban.  For example, the 
level of government or education projects had no impact on the number of Taliban 
attacks against similar targets.  This would appear to disprove the common 
perception that schools and government facilities are attacked and destroyed by 
the Taliban as soon as they are completed.  There was also no correlation, 
positive or negative, between attacks and infrastructure projects or population at 
large projects.  At the provincial level, this refutes the findings from the district 
analysis that infrastructure and population at large projects had a negative 
correlation on the UN assessed risk levels.  The primary relationship that was 
uncovered by the analysis in this chapter was the significant positive correlation 
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between an increase in security projects and an increase in overall attacks and 
attacks targeting security forces and the general population. 
Chapter V presents the last set of analytical data.  Various approaches are 
described, each an attempt to test previous results while addressing some of the 
inherent limitations of the very detailed approaches utilized in the earlier chapters.  
Most notably is the inclusion of every province, making this the first nation-wide 
analysis.  Additionally, data was also analyzed over an aggregated four year 
period, in addition to the year-to-year approach in Chapters III and IV.  The 
introduction of an attack “intensity” metric attempted to overcome the previous 
shortcomings of assuming all attacks were equal.  The results of these 
calculations primarily confirmed earlier conclusions, namely the positive 
correlation between security projects and Taliban attacks, and the lack of any 
influence from the strategic project efforts on reducing levels of violence. 
C. SUMMARY 
This study admittedly covers only a small portion of the national 
reconstruction effort; elements such as anti-corruption, counter-narcotics, judicial 
reform, political accountability, etc. are not included.  However, it does cover 
security, the one item almost all experts cite as the “absolute prerequisite” to post-
conflict reconstruction.  Additionally, it contrasts security with some of the most 
visible elements of the international effort – reconstruction projects that are either 
completed or on-going that the villagers can either use or see being built.   
Unfortunately the results are not encouraging.  Perhaps the most 
significant finding in terms of dollars was that the $10.7 billion strategic 
reconstruction program, both in infrastructure and security had no effect on the 
level of violence and Taliban attacks.  The most prominent relationship was the 
positive correlation between security projects and the overall number of attacks, 
the number of attacks against security targets and the number of attacks against 
the population as a whole.  In one analysis, the increase in security projects 
accounted for an amazing 76 percent of the increase in attacks.  Additionally, 
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through time lag analysis, it was determined that the increases occurred in the 
same year.  It is possible, however, highly unlikely that this was simply 
coincidental, which means that an increase in one brought a response and led to 
an increase in the other.  In trying to theorize about the causation cycle, it would 
seem the Taliban decision making process on target selection at the local level 
would be much more responsive and quick to react than the international 
community in identifying, planning, designing, funding and building specific 
projects.  It can be said, therefore, in a surprising and counter-intuitive finding that 
an increase in security projects actually caused and increase in attacks within a 
certain area.  
Two significant trends uncovered in this thesis, when combined, offer 
insight into the real undercurrents of the conflict in Afghanistan and new policy 
alternatives.  First, agriculture development, rural development, and natural 
resources development aid which directly targeted the livelihood of most Afghans, 
namely rural farming produced the greatest results in decreasing the localized risk 
from the Taliban.  Second, the localized aid which was designed to either target 
the Taliban directly or increase the capacity of the Afghan security forces to 
confront the Taliban, rather than decreasing attacks, was responsible for an 
incredible 76 percent of the increase in attacks.  In the more generalized sense, 
these results can be characterized as addressing the needs of the population 
decreased Taliban presence and attacking the Taliban directly actually increased 
their presence.  From the perspective of a conventional military operation 
designed to eliminate the remaining Taliban elements, these results are 
incongruous.  From a counter-insurgency perspective, however, where winning 
the trust and confidence of the population is the key to success and direct military 
action is secondary, these results fit the model perfectly.  This analysis clearly 
shows that in Afghanistan we are in the midst of an insurgency – counter-




first recognize this and secondly, tailor operations and expectations to a counter-
insurgency approach where the emphasis is not on the number of Taliban killed, 
but rather on the number of Afghans directly assisted. 
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APPENDIX A. UN RISK ASSESSMENT MAPS 
UN Risk Assessment Maps from 2002 to 2007 are provided below. 143   The 
districts subject to analysis in Chapter III are outlined to help increase the geographic 
awareness of the districts in question, and facilitate annual comparisons of the Taliban’s 
growing influence.144   
 
 
                                                 
143 http://www.aims.org.af/ (accessed 16 March 2008) and NY Times on-line at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2007/09/01/world/middleeast/20070901_AFGHAN_GRAPHIC.
html (accessed 16 March 2008). 
144 District overlay is a relative approximation and solely the work of the author who bears 
responsibility for any inaccuracy. 
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APPENDIX B. RECONSTRUCTION PROJECTS DATASET 
Below is the combined dataset of small-scale projects and PRT projects 
used in the analysis for this study.  The data was derived from the ACSP 
database and extensively modified as described in Chapter III.  It lists the number 




















































































Badakhshan 2002 1 5  2 8
  2003 1 2 3 7 1 14
  2004 17 29 5 4 107 2 1 1 166
  2005 69 64 12 44 117 7 4 317
  2006 104 56 5 17 179 1 5 9 376
  2007 11 34 1 1 43 8  98
  M   4 5 19 4 27 59
Badakhshan Total 203 192 30 69 472 10 18 44 1038
Badghis 2002   5 1 1  1 8
  2003 1 15 1 2 21 2 42
  2004 8 1 5 9 71 3 97
  2005 51 34 9 14 232 3 3 137 483
  2006 19 85 18 48 141 6 46 363
  2007 11 54 2 62 83 8 220
  M 4 13 2 28 6 5 13 71
Badghis Total 94 207 38 163 555 3 14 210 1284
Baghlan 2003 1 1 3  1 6
  2004 20 27 5 2 92 1 23 170
  2005 13 35 10 6 93 7 2 49 215
  2006 72 77 7 16 191 2 5 65 435
  2007 14 79 8 7 109 3 11 231
  M 6 45 8 1 17 1 7 19 104
Baghlan Total 126 263 39 32 505 10 18 168 1161
Baghlan,Kabul 2006   6    6
Baghlan,Kabul Total   6    6
Baghlan,Kunduz 2006   6    6
Baghlan,Kunduz Total   6    6
Balkh 2003 3 3 6 18  1 31
  2004 9 40 14 161 2 2 228
  2005 12 66 13 8 202 11 4 34 350
  2006 13 50 2 2 128 6 6 4 211
  2007 5 21 1 77 3 1 108
  M   1 7 3 5 3 48 67
Balkh Total 42 181 43 10 589 24 16 90 995
Balkh,Kabul 2004   9    9
  2006   2  2
Balkh,Kabul Total   11    11
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Bamian 2002 1 6 4 1 6  1 19
  2003 1 13 46  60
  2004 98 14 7 171 1 5 296
  2005 88 29 9 13 189 8 48 384
  2006 47 46 3 26 223 4 9 13 371
  2007 1 10 1 3 49 2 5 71
  M   9 1 8 11 1 17 47
Bamian Total 236 118 33 44 692 23 13 89 1248
Bamian,Balkh 2006   2    2
  2007   2  2
Bamian,Balkh Total   2 2    4
Daykondi 2002   1    1
  2003   4  4
  2004 8 2 79  89
  2005 8 38 2 30 7 85
  2006 22 30 109 2 163
  2007 4 3 27 1  35
  M   1 3 9 1 14
Daykondi Total 42 73 3 3 250 10 10 391
Farah 2002   1    1
  2003 4 1 1 17  23
  2004 29 32 5 187 1 1 1 256
  2005 37 53 10 5 195 2 5 307
  2006 24 96 6 4 116 3 8 257
  2007 4 1 4 2 51 2 64
  M 1 64 40 13 33 6 24 58 239
Farah Total 99 247 66 25 599 9 28 74 1147
Faryab 2002 1 1 2    4
  2003 2 2 3 2 30  39
  2004 7 18 7 73 19 124
  2005 28 45 9 6 113 3 5 32 241
  2006 3 2 3 32 144 4 29 217
  2007 5 1 139 1  146
  M 6 24 14 30 29 7 20 25 155
Faryab Total 52 93 36 70 530 10 30 105 926
Faryab,Nangarhar 2005   2    2
Faryab,Nangarhar Total   2    2
Ghazni 2002   2 2    4
  2003 2 3 1 55  61
  2004 94 23 5 3 199 13 337
  2005 63 47 18 39 257 8 3 15 450
  2006 93 25 13 40 161 3 4 19 358
  2007 67 22 5 9 93 2 14 212
  M   7 6 8 5 16 42
Ghazni Total 319 119 51 92 773 19 14 77 1464
Ghowr 2003 1 2 2 29    34
  2004 48 10 4 1 182 7 252
  2005 37 42 7 3 138 3 36 266
  2006 63 109 17 152 5 15 361
  2007 3 56 14 9 82
  M 5 13 2 20 17 11 7 7 82
Ghowr Total 157 232 15 41 532 14 12 74 1077
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Helmand 2002 19 11   30
  2003 2 4 1 36  43
  2004 38 9 12 2 182 3 5 251
  2005 37 86 18 38 173 12 15 44 423
  2006 75 29 16 5 55 1 30 16 227
  2007 25 3 8 1 61 4 14 13 129
  M 24 22 27 48 36 7 28 48 240
Helmand Total 220 153 82 94 543 24 101 126 1343
Helmand  M    1 1
Helmand  Total    1 1
Helmand, Kondoz 2006   4    4
Helmand, Kondoz Total   4    4
Herat 2002 2 6 1 3 5  3 20
  2003 3 4 1 5 10 1 24
  2004 54 59 14 7 198 3 5 10 350
  2005 101 96 19 23 204 9 16 15 483
  2006 41 204 16 70 197 3 29 37 597
  2007 37 84 1 49 4 2 177
  M 3 19 12 13 29 19 11 46 152
Herat Total 241 472 64 121 692 34 65 114 1803
Jowzjan 2003 2 11 1 24    38
  2004 4 28 5 120 18 175
  2005 12 20 8 13 210 3 30 296
  2006 2 21 15 118 24 180
  2007 1 8 9 2 20
  M   1 1 1 3 11 10 27
Jowzjan Total 21 78 25 29 482 6 11 84 736
Kabol (Kabul) 2002 9 11 4 2 21    47
  2003 3 3 5 3 78 1 4 97
  2004 13 10 9 2 268 3 11 316
  2005 60 19 18 2 289 3 2 122 515
  2006 34 14 6 9 205 9 24 301
  2007 21 18 11 9 93 22 23 197
  M 1 418 8 72 48 9 15 136 707
Kabol (Kabul) Total 141 493 61 99 1002 12 52 320 2180
Kandahar 2002 37 5 1 13    56
  2003 3 4 2 67 1  77
  2004 73 16 7 233 1 1 2 333
  2005 90 55 15 13 293 7 7 6 486
  2006 164 31 29 24 119 4 77 18 466
  2007 141 32 19 8 132 4 70 20 426
  M 16 8 14 36 183 15 45 54 371
Kandahar Total 524 151 87 81 1040 32 200 100 2215
Kandahar, M 1    1
Kandahar, Helmand & 3 1    1
Kapisa 2002 1 4    5
  2003   5 1 25  31
  2004 50 27 7 163 1 18 266
  2005 49 52 9 3 241 3 67 424
  2006 48 79 12 2 167 1 84 393
  2007 12 87 2 23 48 1 9 182
  M 1 1 2 1 3 2 8 18
Kapisa Total 161 251 33 28 649 6 5 186 1319
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Khowst 2002 1    1
  2003 3 5 2 33 2 45
  2004 37 1 4 2 128 1 1 174
  2005 159 68 16 4 436 7 4 45 739
  2006 65 13 6 13 145 11 35 288
  2007 41 17 16 18 31 21 7 151
  M 1 4 10 1 4 3 6 1 30
Khowst Total 307 103 57 40 777 11 42 91 1428
Kondoz (Kunduz) 2002 1    1
  2003 2 1 83  86
  2004 12 31 9 4 175 1 2 7 241
  2005 12 70 17 36 197 5 1 28 366
  2006 16 104 4 197 1 13 335
  2007 3 85 1 184 3 1 277
  M 1 12 10 1 6 2 2 26 60
Kondoz (Kunduz) Total 47 302 41 42 842 8 9 75 1366
Kunar 2002 1    1
  2003   1 44  45
  2004 47 20 4 2 132 2 4 211
  2005 51 22 9 5 109 7 3 11 217
  2006 29 16 5 5 68 1 8 132
  2007 18 5 5 6 66 6 106
  M 1 10 23 1 12 9 56
Kunar Total 147 63 34 18 442 8 18 38 768
Laghman 2002 1    1
  2003 2 3 1 1 32  39
  2004 64 20 10 2 119 10 225
  2005 226 54 12 4 306 4 1 39 646
  2006 71 56 5 129 13 274
  2007 20 7 1 32 1 61
  M   1 5 4 3 8 17 38
Laghman Total 384 141 33 8 622 7 9 80 1284
Laghman  2004    1 1
  M   1 1
Laghman  Total    2 2
Laghman, Kabol 2006   2    2
Laghman, Kabol (Kabul)   2    2
Laghman, 2006   1    1
Laghman, Nangarhar Total   1    1
Lowgar 2002   1 2    3
  2003 1 3 16 1 21
  2004 22 5 4 2 118 1 10 162
  2005 24 36 10 16 195 4 1 5 291
  2006 35 24 8 8 139 3 10 227
  2007 7 4 2 40 1 54
  M   6 4 1 5 2 6 24
Lowgar Total 89 76 31 26 511 9 7 33 782
Nangarhar 2002   1    1
  2003 1 2 3 103  109
  2004 61 1 13 1 209 1  286
  2005 216 75 23 8 336 12 6 226 902
  2006 98 73 21 10 255 1 1 14 473
  2007 23 19 4 1 69 1 6 123
  M 1 6 13 1 16 23 7 50 117
Nangarhar Total 400 176 74 24 989 37 15 296 2011
Nangarhar,Kapisa 2004   10    10
  2006   8  8
 119
Nangarhar,Kapisa Total   18    18
Nimruz 2002 1 2    3
  2003 1 1 14  16
  2004 14 23 4 87 2 130
  2005 28 44 7 7 196 3 2 287
  2006 18 2 46 1  67
  2007   7  7
  M   1 1 12 3 5 23 45
Nimruz Total 62 70 13 19 355 3 6 27 555
Nimruz  M    1 1
Nimruz  Total    1 1
Nuristan 2002   1    1
  2003 4 3 2 2 10  21
  2004   4 1 11  16
  2005 29 17 7 6 74 3 2 3 141
  2006 32 9 3 82 2 1 129
  2007 1 1 1 40 1  44
  M   1 3 9 8 4  25
Nuristan Total 66 31 19 10 227 13 7 4 377
Pakistan 2006   1   1
Pakistan Total   1   1
Paktia 2003 3 2 1 3 22    31
  2004 37 6 12 183 2 15 255
  2005 96 47 18 19 306 7 16 509
  2006 62 70 18 22 191 17 7 387
  2007 15 21 7 14 45 2 3 107
  M   2 4 1 4 2 9 1 23
Paktia Total 213 148 60 59 751 9 30 42 1312
Paktia  2005    1 1
Paktia  Total    1 1
Paktika 2003 1 1 22    24
  2004 110 2 3 1 202 1 319
  2005 76 12 12 7 157 5 145 414
  2006 46 76 26 23 311 10 492
  2007 15 46 11 17 49 1 8 147
  M 2 23 22 11 25 9 4 96
Paktika Total 250 159 75 59 766 5 10 168 1492
Panjsher 2007   9    9
Panjsher Total   9    9
Panjshir 2003 5 2 6    13
  2004 18 3 19 2 42
  2005 40 3 13 2 61 5 10 134
  2006 59 5 8 146 2 12 232
  2007 4 8 5 18 2 4 41
  M 1 4 4 2  11
Panjshir Total 127 18 33 2 250 9 6 28 473
Parvan (Parwan) 2002 1 11 1 6    19
  2003 4 6 2 1 52  65
  2004 19 21 12 161 1 17 231
  2005 41 28 13 5 128 6 2 45 268
  2006 55 64 2 13 173 2 163 472
  2007 17 58 1 3 81 83 243
  M 4 15 9 5 12 5 1 25 76
Parvan (Parwan) Total 141 203 39 28 613 12 5 333 1374
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Parvan 2006   2    2
Parvan (Parwan),Takhar   2    2
Parwan 2007   2    2
Parwan Total   2    2
Samangan 2003   8 5    13
  2004 21 11 4 171 21 228
  2005 12 8 8 5 145 8 1 95 282
  2006 16 66 1 101 25 209
  2007 3 38 26  67
  M   1 2 1 10 1 7 22
Samangan Total 52 124 23 5 449 18 2 148 821
Sar-e Pol 2003   1 1 5    7
  2004 31 2 4 121 27 185
  2005 63 13 9 2 275 2 29 393
  2006 19 11 1 96 8 135
  2007 2 13 12  27
  M   5 3 5 2 15
Sar-e Pol Total 115 39 20 3 509 5 5 66 762
Sar-e Pol  2005 1    1
Sar-e Pol  Total 1    1
Sar-e Pol, Ghazni 2006   1    1
Sar-e Pol, Ghazni Total   1    1
Tajikistan 2006   1    1
Tajikistan Total   1    1
Takhar 2002   4 1    5
  2003 2 1 49  52
  2004 11 10 9 1 207 4 242
  2005 9 34 10 19 187 5 1 32 297
  2006 38 68 3 51 93 10 263
  2007 6 20 34  60
  M   5 7 1 17 1 13 44
Takhar Total 66 141 30 71 572 22 2 59 963
Takhar  2005    1 1
Takhar  Total    1 1
Takhar, Helmand 2004   1    1
  2006   2  2
Takhar, Helmand Total   3    3
Vardak (Wardag) 2002   5    5
  2003   1 1 1 25  28
  2004 26 25 5 124 1 181
  2005 73 12 13 4 242 7 5 17 373
  2006 65 1 2 117 1 13 199
  2007 13 3 40  56
  M   1 5 1 10 2 19
Vardak (Wardag) Total 177 43 26 5 554 17 6 33 861
Wardak 2007   4    4
Wardak Total   4    4
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(blank) 2003   1 1    2
  2004   3  3
  2005   1 39  40
  2006 2 14 6  22
  2007   9 1 10
  M 9 22 60  91
(blank) Total 11 2 79 75 1 168
Farah, Kunar 2006   1    1
Farah, Kunar Total   1    1
Kunar, Kondoz 2006   4    4
Kunar, Kondoz (Kunduz)   4    4
Zabul 2002 5 4 5    14
  2003 3 29  32
  2004 59 22  81
  2005 28 9 9 4 20 1 3 74
  2006 18 6 17 10 39 2 3 95
  2007 6 1 4 10 1  22
  M   1 7 17 4 12 5 30 76
Zabul Total 119 21 37 31 129 14 7 36 394
Uruzgan 2002 3 1    4
  2003   2 1 11  14
  2004 1 4 4 1 6 2 18
  2005 22 25 15 2 139 3 17 3 226
  2006 118 19 23 29 105 4 13 21 332
  2007 11 6 5 21 48 5 19 115
  M 47 26 21 33 53 24 25 48 277
Uruzgan Total 202 81 70 87 362 31 60 93 986
Uruzgan, 2006   2    2
Uruzgan, Badakhshan Total   2    2
Grand Total 5655 5267 1421 1538 19784 474 929 3528 38596
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APPENDIX C. DETAILED PROVINCE DATASET 
Below is a copy of the dataset used in the analysis in Chapter IV.  After 
extensive modifications and improvements to the data from both the ACSP and 
WITS databases, the dataset lists each of the fourteen provinces under study, 
with the number of attacks and reconstruction projects by year that were 
associated with one of five different categories developed for this project;  
 
  ATTACKS 
Province  
 List 
Year Business Government 
Hum / 





farah 2004 2 0 0 0 3 0 5 2 
  2005 0 1 1 3 5 0 10 5 
  2006 2 5 3 8 19 0 37 18 
  2007 2 0 1 6 13 0 22 9 
ghazni 2004 0 1 1 0 1 0 3 2 
  2005 0 1 9 7 5 0 22 17 
  2006 16 23 4 18 44 1 106 62 
  2007 8 8 2 18 26 2 64 38 
helmand 2004 0 2 1 3 3 1 10 7 
  2005 1 13 11 12 30 1 68 38 
  2006 4 16 17 25 63 0 125 62 
  2007 1 4 6 17 17 0 45 28 
herat 2004 1 3 1 2 1 0 8 7 
  2005 1 4 0 5 3 0 13 10 
  2006 1 3 6 10 11 2 33 22 
  2007 0 4 0 4 5 0 13 8 
kabol 2004 1 2 1 4 3 0 11 8 
  2005 0 3 2 15 7 1 28 21 
  2006 3 5 3 22 12 3 48 36 
  2007 2 3 0 6 5 0 16 11 
kandahar 2004 4 3 5 3 8 1 24 16 
  2005 12 13 12 25 25 7 94 69 
  2006 8 7 8 42 58 1 124 66 
  2007 1 2 4 13 44 2 66 22 
khowst 2004 2 4 2 5 2 0 15 13 
  2005 3 7 10 7 11 0 38 27 
  2006 4 5 10 21 34 5 79 45 
  2007 1 2 6 15 14 0 38 24 
Kunar 2004 1 2 0 5 1 0 9 8 
  2005 1 2 1 6 7 1 18 11 
  2006 2 2 0 13 3 0 20 17 
  2007 1 0 2 12 6 0 21 15 
nangarhar 2004 2 4 4 6 2 0 18 16 
  2005 3 4 3 12 7 1 30 23 
  2006 8 2 3 15 12 0 40 28 
  2007 1 1 4 5 6 0 17 11 
paktia 2004 0 2 5 1 1 0 9 8 
  2005 0 1 1 3 3 0 8 5 
  2006 5 3 4 12 12 0 36 24 
  2007 4 4 4 6 13 1 32 19 
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  ATTACKS  CONTINUED 
Province  
 List 
Year Business Government 
Hum / 





          
paktika 2004 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 
  2005 0 3 3 0 2 0 8 6 
  2006 0 8 5 10 15 2 40 25 
  2007 1 5 0 9 9 0 24 15 
uruzgan 2004 0 5 0 1 2 0 8 6 
  2005 4 10 2 6 12 0 34 22 
  2006 1 1 2 2 11 0 17 6 
  2007 0 1 1 7 8 0 17 9 
vardak 2004 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
  2005 0 0 3 3 4 0 10 6 
  2006 5 3 5 5 12 0 30 18 
  2007 3 0 0 0 7 0 10 3 
zabul 2004 1 1 1 4 0 0 7 7 
  2005 2 8 3 14 24 0 51 27 
  2006 8 1 2 17 33 0 61 28 
  2007 1 2 0 6 16 1 26 10 






         
PROVINCE List Year Security 
Good 
Governance HUM/NGO BUSINESS 
POP AT 
LARGE 
Farah 2004 1 5 32 188 30 
  2005 0 10 58 197 42 
  2006 3 6 100 116 32 
  2007 0 4 3 51 6 
Ghazni 2004 0 5 26 199 107 
  2005 3 18 86 265 78 
  2006 4 13 65 164 112 
  2007 2 5 31 93 81 
Helmand 2004 3 12 11 182 43 
  2005 15 18 124 185 81 
  2006 30 16 34 60 91 
  2007 14 8 4 65 38 
Herat 2004 5 14 66 201 64 
  2005 16 19 119 213 116 
  2006 29 16 274 200 78 
  2007 4 1 84 49 39 
Kabol (Kabul) 2004 3 9 12 268 24 
  2005 2 18 21 292 182 
  2006 9 6 23 205 58 
  2007 22 11 27 93 44 
Kandahar 2004 1 7 16 234 75 
  2005 7 15 68 300 96 
  2006 77 29 55 123 182 
  2007 70 19 40 136 161 
Khowst 2004 0 4 3 129 38 
  2005 4 16 72 443 204 
  2006 11 6 26 145 100 
  2007 21 16 35 31 48 
Kunar 2004 2 4 22 132 51 
  2005 3 9 27 116 62 
  2006 1 5 21 72 37 
  2007 0 5 11 66 24 
Nangarhar 2004 0 13 2 220 61 
  2005 6 23 83 348 442 
  2006 1 21 83 264 112 
  2007 1 4 20 69 29 
Paktia 2004 2 12 6 183 52 
  2005 0 18 66 313 113 
  2006 17 18 92 191 69 
  2007 2 7 35 45 18 
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PROJECTS  CONTINUED 
         
PROVINCE List Year Security Good Governance HUM/NGO BUSINESS POP AT LARGE 
Paktika 2004 0 3 3 202 111 
  2005 0 12 19 162 221 
  2006 0 26 99 311 56 
  2007 1 11 63 49 23 
Uruzgan 2004 0 4 5 6 3 
  2005 17 15 27 142 25 
  2006 13 23 48 109 139 
  2007 5 5 27 48 30 
Vardak (Wardag) 2004 0 5 25 124 27 
  2005 5 13 16 249 90 
  2006 1 2 1 117 78 
  2007 0 0 3 44 13 
Zabul 2004 0 0 0 22 59 
  2005 1 9 13 20 31 
  2006 0 17 16 41 21 
  2007 1 4 1 10 6 




STRATEGIC  PROJECTS 
       
PROVINCE List Year 
Infrastructure & 
Natural Resources Security Grand Total 
Farah 2004 0 0 0 
  2005 $86,300,000 $0 $86,300,000 
  2006 $1,940,000 $0 $1,940,000 
  2007 $0 $0 $0 
Ghazni 2004 $26,500,000 $0 $26,500,000 
  2005 $0 $0 $0 
  2006 $22,484,289 $0 $22,484,289 
  2007 $48,985,450 $0 $48,985,450 
Helmand 2004 $0 $0 $0 
  2005 $180,000,000 $135,705,587 $315,705,587 
  2006 $74,140,000 $5,956,533 $80,096,533 
  2007 $0 $0 $0 
Herat 2004 $120,000,000 $69,544,761 $189,544,761 
  2005 $267,300,000 $0 $267,300,000 
  2006 $27,500,000 $15,000,000 $42,500,000 
  2007 $30,000,000 $10,000,000 $40,000,000 
Kabol (Kabul) 2004 $60,000,000 $8,900,000 $68,900,000 
  2005 $35,130,000 $149,225,059 $184,355,059 
  2006 $20,520,000 $359,933,774 $380,453,774 
  2007 $35,060,000 $156,758,881 $191,818,881 
Kandahar 2004 $151,990,000 $66,688,145 $218,678,145 
  2005 $5,546,740 $5,600,000 $11,146,740 
  2006 $20,000,000 $81,800,000 $101,800,000 
  2007 $159,877,282 $35,983,833 $195,861,115 
Khowst 2004 $0 $0 $0 
  2005 $0 $77,622,540 $77,622,540 
  2006 $0 $800,000 $800,000 
  2007 $20,000,000 $0 $20,000,000 
Konar (Kunar) 2004 $0 $0 $0 
  2005 $45,000,000 $0 $45,000,000 
  2006 $15,362,359 $0 $15,362,359 
  2007 $0 $0 $0 
Nangarhar 2004 $27,600,000 $0 $27,600,000 
  2005 $63,000,000 $0 $63,000,000 
  2006 $54,300,000 $0 $54,300,000 
  2007 $0 $6,000,000 $6,000,000 
Paktia 2004 $65,200,000 $0 $65,200,000 
  2005 $7,667,369 $3,100,000 $10,767,369 
  2006 $1,262,797 $66,462,796 $67,725,593 
  2007 $0 $0 $0 
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STRATEGIC  PROJECTS  CONTINUED 
PROVINCE List Year 
Infrastructure & 
Natural Resources Security Grand Total 
Paktika 2004 $0 $0 $0 
  2005 $0 $0 $0 
  2006 $117,634,688 $6,750,000 $124,384,688 
  2007 $34,580,000 $0 $34,580,000 
Oruzgan (Uruzgan) 2004 $0 $0 $0 
  2005 $0 $0 $0 
  2006 $34,300,000 $0 $34,300,000 
  2007 $0 $0 $0 
Vardak 2004 $0 $0 $0 
  2005 $110,000,000 $0 $110,000,000 
  2006 $0 $0 $0 
  2007 $0 $0 $0 
Zabol (Zabul) 2004 $82,800,000 $64,200,000 $147,000,000 
  2005 $0 $0 $0 
  2006 $0 $800,000 $800,000 
  2007 $0 $63,742,780 $63,742,780 






APPENDIX D. WITS DATASET 
Below is a copy of the dataset used in the analysis in Chapter V.  It 
combines the final modifications of the combined small-scale and PRT database, 
the Strategic Projects database in addition to the WITS data as described in the 
methodology section of the chapter.  For every province in the country it lists by 
year, the overall number of projects, the number of projects for each of the eight 
ANDS sectors, the total value of strategic projects, and individual values for 
strategic security projects and strategic infrastructure projects, and list the number 















































































































































































































(Kabul) 2004 13 10 9 2 268 0 3 11 0 316 $60,000 $8,900 $68,900 11 6.3 
  2005 60 19 18 2 289 3 2 122 0 515 $35,130 $149,225 $184,355 28 2.2 
  2006 34 14 6 9 205 0 9 24 0 301 $20,520 $359,933 $380,453 48 6.7 
  2007 17 9 1 6 93 0 22 9 0 157 $35,060 $156,758 $191,818 16 11.8 
Bamian 2004 98 14 7 0 171 0 1 5 0 296 $0 $0 $0 0 0 
  2005 88 29 9 13 189 8 0 48 0 384 $0 $0 $0 0 0 
  2006 47 46 3 26 223 4 9 13 0 371 $0 $0 $0 0 0 
  2007 1 10 1 3 49 0 2 5 0 71 $0 $0 $0 0 0 
Daykondi 2004 8 2 0 0 79 0 0 0 0 89 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
  2005 8 38 2 0 30 0 0 7 0 85 $0 $0 $0 1 15.0 
  2006 22 30 0 0 109 0 0 2 0 163 $0 $0 $0 2 1.7 
  2007 4 3 0 0 27 0 1 0 0 35 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
Ghazni 2004 94 23 5 3 199 0 0 13 0 337 $26,500 $0 $26,500 3 3.7 
  2005 63 47 18 39 257 8 3 15 0 450 $0 $0 $0 22 2.4 
  2006 93 25 13 40 161 3 4 19 5 363 $22,484 $0 $22,484 106 1.7 
  2007 67 22 5 9 93 0 2 14 0 212 $48,985 $0 $48,985 64 2.8 
Kapisa 2004 50 27 7 0 163 0 1 18 0 266 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
  2005 49 52 9 3 241 3 0 67 0 424 $23,000 $0 $23,000 1 1.0 
  2006 48 79 12 2 167 0 1 84 0 393 $0 $0 $0 14 2.0 
  2007 12 87 2 23 48 0 1 9 0 182 $0 $0 $0 4 0.8 
Khowst 2004 37 1 4 2 128 1 0 1 0 174 $0 $0 $0 15 2.3 
  2005 159 68 16 4 436 7 4 45 1 740 $0 $77,622 $77,6220 38 1.8 
  2006 65 13 6 13 145 0 11 35 5 293 $0 $800 $800 79 4.8 
  2007 41 17 16 18 31 0 21 7 0 151 $20,000 $0 $20,000 38 6.3 
Kunar 2004 47 20 4 2 132 0 2 4 0 211 $0 $0 $0 9 1.6 
  2005 51 22 9 5 109 7 3 11 0 217 $45,000 $0 $45,000 18 2.4 
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  2006 29 16 5 5 68 0 1 8 1 133 $15,362 $0 $15,362 20 5.9 
  2007 18 5 5 6 66 0 0 6 0 106 $0 $0 $0 21 4.3 
Laghman 2004 64 20 10 2 119 0 0 10 0 225 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
  2005 226 54 12 4 306 4 1 39 3 649 $9,179 $0 $9,179 8 1.5 
  2006 71 56 5 0 129 0 0 13 0 274 $38,988 $0 $38,988 23 0.9 
  2007 20 7 0 1 32 0 0 1 0 61 $0 $0 $0 17 4.0 
Lowgar 2004 22 5 4 2 118 0 1 10 0 162 $0 $0 $0 4 1.0 
  2005 24 36 10 16 195 4 1 5 0 291 $6,020 $0 $6,020 8 1.6 
  2006 35 24 8 8 139 0 3 10 1 228 $0 $0 $0 18 0.6 
  2007 7 4 2 0 40 0 0 1 0 54 $0 $0 $0 14 1.1 
Nangarha
r 2004 61 1 13 1 209 1 0 0 0 286 $27,600 $0 $27,600 18 4.3 
  2005 216 75 23 8 336 12 6 226 0 902 $63,000 $0 $63,0000 30 2.0 
  2006 98 73 21 10 255 1 1 14 1 474 $54,300 $0 $54,300 40 2.6 
  2007 23 19 4 1 69 0 1 6 0 123 $0 $6,000 $6,000 17 4.3 
Nuristan 2004 0 0 4 1 11 0 0 0 0 16 $0 $0 $0 1 3.0 
  2005 29 17 7 6 74 3 2 3 0 141 $0 $0 $0 8 2.9 
  2006 32 9 3 0 82 2 0 1 0 129 $45,237 $0 $45,237 5 2.4 
  2007 1 1 0 1 40 0 1 0 0 44 $291,000 $0 $291,000 7 2.4 
Paktia 2004 37 6 12 0 183 0 2 15 0 255 $65,200 $0 $65,200 9 5.0 
  2005 96 47 18 19 306 7 0 16 1 510 $7,667 $3,100 $10,767 8 2.1 
  2006 62 70 18 22 191 0 17 7 1 388 $1,262 $66,462 $67,725 36 3.5 
  2007 15 21 7 14 45 0 2 3 0 107 $0 $0 $0 32 2.7 
Paktika 2004 110 2 3 1 202 0 0 1 0 319 $0 $0 $0 2 4.0 
  2005 76 12 12 7 157 5 0 145 0 414 $0 $0 $0 8 2.1 
  2006 46 76 26 23 311 0 0 10 1 493 $117,634 $6,750 
$124,384
8 40 3.4 
  2007 15 46 11 17 49 0 1 8 0 147 $34,580 $0 $34,580 24 3.3 
Panjshir 2004 18 0 3 0 19 0 0 2 0 42 $0 $0 $0 0 0 
  2005 40 3 13 2 61 5 0 10 0 134 $0 $0 $0 0 0 
  2006 59 5 8 0 146 0 2 12 2 234 $15,000 $0 $15,000 0 0 
  2007 4 8 5 0 18 0 2 4 0 41 $108,000 $0 $108,000 0 0 
Parvan 
(Parwan) 2004 19 21 12 0 161 1 0 17 0 231 $73,700 $0 $73,700 1 2.0 
  2005 41 28 13 5 128 6 2 45 0 268 $29,200 $36,400 $65,600 0 0.0 
  2006 55 64 2 13 173 0 2 163 0 472 $0 $12,800 $12,800 3 2.0 
  2007 17 58 1 3 81 0 0 83 0 243 $99,600 $0 $99,600 4 13.0 
Vardak 
(Wardag) 2004 26 25 5 0 124 0 0 1 0 181 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
  2005 73 12 13 4 242 7 5 17 0 373 $110,000 $0 $110,000 10 1.2 
  2006 65 1 2 0 117 0 1 13 2 201 $0 $0 $0 29 1.0 
  2007 13 3 0 0 40 0 0 0 0 56 $0 $0 $0 10 3.3 
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Badakhsh
an 2004 17 29 5 4 107 2 1 1 0 166 $0 $0 $0 3 4.0 
  2005 69 64 12 44 115 7 0 4 0 315 $0 $0 $0 3 0.3 
  2006 104 56 5 17 179 1 5 9 0 376 $25,000 $0 $25,000 10 1.5 
  2007 11 34 1 1 43 0 8 0 0 98 $0 $0 $0 4 1.8 
Baghlan 2004 20 27 5 2 92 0 1 23 0 170 $0 $0 $0 1 0.0 
  2005 13 35 10 6 93 7 2 49 0 215 $131,000 $0 $131,000 4 2.0 
  2006 72 77 7 16 191 2 5 65 0 435 $0 $0 $0 12 2.0 
  2007 14 79 8 7 109 0 3 11 0 231 $0 $0 $0 4 0.8 
Balkh 2004 9 40 14 0 161 2 0 2 0 228 $68,400 $0 $68,400 2 0.5 
  2005 12 66 13 8 202 11 4 34 0 350 $0 $3,500 $3,500 10 2.3 
  2006 13 50 2 2 128 6 6 4 0 211 $17,747 $69,404 $87,151 20 2.0 
  2007 5 21 1 0 77 0 3 1 0 108 $0 $6,000 $6,000 10 2.7 
Faryab 2004 7 18 7 0 73 0 0 19 0 124 $0 $0 $0 1 1.0 
  2005 28 45 9 6 113 3 5 32 0 241 $101,000 $0 $101,000 2 4.0 
  2006 3 2 3 32 144 0 4 29 0 217 $155,000 $0 $155,000 7 1.4 
  2007 5 1 0 0 139 0 1 0 0 146 $20,000 $0 $20,000 4 3.5 
Jowzjan 2004 4 28 5 0 120 0 0 18 0 175 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
  2005 12 20 8 13 210 3 0 30 0 296 $15,400 $0 $15,400 2 15.5 
  2006 2 21 0 15 118 0 0 24 0 180 $80,000 $0 $80,000 2 2.0 
  2007 1 8 0 0 9 0 0 2 0 20 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
Kondoz 
(Kunduz) 2004 12 31 9 4 175 1 2 7 0 241 $0 $0 $0 2 7.3 
  2005 12 70 17 36 197 5 1 28 0 366 $35,164 $11,100 $46,264 0 1.0 
  2006 16 104 4 0 197 0 1 13 0 335 $30,000 $0 $30,000 7 5.6 
  2007 3 85 0 1 184 0 3 1 0 277 $0 $0 $0 8 9.9 
Samanga
n 2004 21 11 4 0 171 0 0 21 0 228 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
  2005 12 8 8 5 145 8 1 95 0 282 $0 $0 $0 1 1.0 
  2006 16 66 1 0 101 0 0 25 0 209 $0 $0 $0 2 4.0 
  2007 3 38 0 0 26 0 0 0 0 67 $0 $0 $0 2 1.0 
Sar-e Pol 2004 31 2 4 0 121 0 0 27 0 185 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
  2005 63 13 9 2 275 2 0 29 0 393 $0 $0 $0 1 5.0 
  2006 19 11 1 0 96 0 0 8 0 135 $0 $0 $0 3 0.0 
  2007 2 13 0 0 12 0 0 0 0 27 $0 $0 $0 4 1.8 
Takhar 2004 11 10 9 1 207 0 0 4 0 242 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
  2005 9 34 10 19 187 5 1 32 0 297 $0 $0 $0 2 2.5 
  2006 38 68 3 51 93 0 0 10 0 263 $0 $0 $0 6 0.7 
  2007 6 20 0 0 34 0 0 0 0 60 $85,000 $0 $85,000 1 0.0 
Helmand 2004 38 9 12 2 182 0 3 5 0 251 $0 $0 $0 10 4.0 
  2005 37 86 18 38 173 12 15 44 1 424 $180,000 $135,705 $315,705 68 3.5 
  2006 75 29 16 5 55 1 30 16 4 231 $74,140 $5,956 $80,096 125 4.1 
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  2007 25 3 8 1 61 4 14 13 0 129 $0 $0 $0 45 4.3 
Kandahar 2004 73 16 7 0 233 1 1 2 0 333 $151,990 $66,688 $218,678 22 5.6 
  2005 90 55 15 13 293 7 7 6 1 487 $5,546 $5,600 $11,146 94 4.5 
  2006 164 31 29 24 119 4 77 18 7 473 $20,000 $81,800 $101,800 124 6.6 
  2007 141 32 19 7 132 4 58 20 0 413 $159,877 $35,983 $195,861 66 4.3 
Uruzgan 2004 1 4 4 1 6 0 0 2 0 18 $0 $0 $0 1 4.4 
  2005 22 25 15 2 139 3 17 3 0 226 $0 $0 $0 0 3.3 
  2006 118 19 23 29 105 4 13 21 1 333 $34,300 $0 $34,300 1 8.1 
  2007 11 6 5 12 48 0 5 19 0 106 $0 $0 $0 0 7.5 
Zabul 2004 59 0 0 0 22 0 0 0 0 81 $82,800 $64,200 $147,000 7 4.9 
  2005 28 9 9 4 20 0 1 3 4 78 $0 $0 $0 51 3.5 
  2006 18 6 17 10 39 2 0 3 1 96 $0 $800 $800 61 2.4 
  2007 6 1 4 0 10 0 1 0 0 22 $0 $63,742 $63,742 26 3.3 
Badghis 2004 8 1 5 9 71 0 0 3 0 97 $0 $0 $0 1 5.0 
  2005 51 34 9 14 232 3 3 137 0 483 $101,000 $0 $101,000 2 0.0 
  2006 19 85 18 48 141 0 6 46 0 363 $55,000 $0 $55,000 8 2.8 
  2007 11 54 2 62 83 0 0 8 0 220 $10,000 $0 $10,000 4 2.5 
Farah 2004 29 32 5 0 187 1 1 1 0 256 $0 $0 $0 5 5.6 
  2005 37 53 10 5 195 2 0 5 2 309 $86,300 $0 $86,300 10 3.9 
  2006 24 96 6 4 116 0 3 8 1 258 $1,940 $0 $1,940 37 3.1 
  2007 4 1 4 2 51 0 0 2 0 64 $0 $0 $0 22 6.4 
Ghowr 2004 48 10 4 1 182 0 0 7 0 252 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
  2005 37 42 7 3 138 3 0 36 0 266 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
  2006 63 109 0 17 152 0 5 15 0 361 $0 $0 $0 4 0.8 
  2007 3 55 0 0 14 0 0 9 0 81 $0 $0 $0 0 0.0 
Herat 2004 54 59 14 7 198 3 5 10 0 350 $120,000 $69,544 $189,544 7 6.5 
  2005 101 96 19 23 204 9 16 13 0 481 $267,300 $0 $267,300 13 2.8 
  2006 41 204 16 70 197 3 29 37 0 597 $27,500 $15,000 $42,500 33 3.8 
  2007 37 84 1 0 49 0 4 2 0 177 $30,000 $10,000 $40,000 13 3.9 
Nimruz 2004 14 23 4 0 87 0 0 2 0 130 $88,750 $0 $88,750 1 8.0 
  2005 28 44 7 7 196 3 0 2 0 287 $0 $0 $0 2 9.5 
  2006 18 2 0 0 46 0 1 0 0 67 $0 $0 $0 14 4.1 
  2007 0 0 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 7 $0 $0 $0 8 3.1 
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